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This is the first draft of a report of an analysis 
of the content of Irish party manifestos and prog­
rammes from 1948 to 1981, a shorter version of 
which will be published in Ian Budge and David 
Robertson (eds), Party Strategy (London & Beverly 
Hills: Sage, 1984). Comments on the analysis and 
suggestions for improvements will be very welcome.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE ISSUE-DIMENSIONS IN POST-WAR IRISH POLITICS
This paper sets out to identify the main issue dimensions in 
the post-war politics of the Irish Republic and to then locate 
the positions of the major political parties along those 
dimensions. The data on which the analysis is based are the 
programmes and manifestos issued by these parties - Fianna 
Fail, Fine Gael and Labour - in the ten general elections held 
between 1948 and 1981. These programmes were coded according 
to a scheme originally devised by David Robertson (1976) to 
analyse British party manifestos, and subsequently modified 
by members of an ECPR research group in order to apply it to 
the election literature of some twenty different democracies 
including, in this case, the Irish Republic in the post-war 
period. The categories used in this coding scheme are shown 
in table 1 .
(Table 1 about here)
Ideally, in an analysis such as this, one would hope to be 
able to identify a number of different dimensions, each of 
which would make immediate substantive sense. Such would be 
the case, for instance, if the analysis pointed to the 
presence of a major left-right dimension or, in the Irish 
case, to some form of nationalist dimension. At the same 
time, ideally one would find that, over time, the various 
parties retained reasonably fixed or consistent positions 
along these dimensions. Alternatively, if the parties' 
positions did change, one could ideally explain this change 
in terms of other knowledge about the party system or through 
theories of party competition in general.
Such would be the ideal result of this type of analysis.
In practice, however, it might happen that issue dimensions 
derived from an analysis of party programmes seem to bear 
little relation to what is normally seen to be the political 



































































































DOMAIN 1: EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Foreign Special Relationships: Positive 
Favourable mention to countries particularly 
involved with the relevant country. In the 
Irish case, this refers only to Britain.
Foreign Special Relationships: Negative 
In the Irish case this is taken to involve 
statements in favour of Irish unity and of 
the severing of the link between Northern 
Ireland and the rest of the United Kincrdom.
Decolonisation
Favourable mentions of decolonisation, need, 
for US/UK etc. to leave colonies, greater 
self government, and independance, need to 
train natives for this, need to give special 
aid to make up for colonial past.
Military: Positive
Need for strong military presence overseas, 
for re-armament and self-defence, need to keep 
to military treaty obligations, need to secure 






Declaration of belief in Peace and peaceful 
means of solving crises. Need for disarmament 
and negotiations with hostile countries.
Internationalism: Positive
Support for UN, need for international cooperation, 
need for aid to developing countries, need for 
world planning of resources, peed for international 
courts, support for any international aim or world 
state.






































































































Internationalism:Negative via à vis EEC and 
Europe.
DOMAIN 2: FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY
Freedom and Domestic Human Rights 
Favourable mentions of importance of personal 
freedom, civil rights, freedom of choice in 
education, freedom from bureaucratic control, 
freedom of speech, freedom from coercion in 
industrial and political sphere, individualism.
Democracy
Favourable mention of democracy as method or goal, 
in national and other organisations, support for 
worker participation, for involvement of all 
citizens in decision making, as well as generali­
zed support for symbols of democracy.
Constitutionalism: Positive
Support for specified aspects of a formal con­
stitution, use of constitutionalism as an 
argument for policy as well as generalised 
approval for 'constitutional' way of doing 
things.
Constitutionalism: Negative 
DOMAIN 3: GOVERNMENT 
Decentralisation: Positive
Support for devolution, regional administration 
on politics or economy, support for keeping up 
local and regional customs and symbols, defer­
ence to local expertise in planning etc.
302 Decentralisation: Negative
303 Government Efficiency
Need for efficiency in government (eg merit 
system in civil service), economy in govern­
ment, cutting down civil service, improving 
governmental procedures, general appeal to 
make process of government and administration 







































































































Need to eliminate corruption in government, 
and associated abuse, eg regulation of cam­
paign expenses, need to check pandering to 
selfish interests.
Government Effectiveness and Authority 
Includes references to government stability.
DOMAIN 4: ECONOMY
Enterprise
Favourable mention of private property rights, 
personal enterprise and initiative, need for 
unhampered individual enterprises; favourable 
mention of free enterprise capitalism, sup­
eriority of individual enterprise over state, 
and over state buying or management systems.
Incentives
Need for financial and other incentives and 
for opportunities for the young etc, encour­
agement to small businesses and one-man shops, 
need for wage and tax policies designed to 
induce enterprise, Home Ownership.
Regulation of Capita1ism
Need for régula tions designed to make private 
enterprise work better; actions against mono­
polies and trusts and in defense of consumer 
and small businessmen; anti-profiteering.
Economic Planning
Favourable mention of central planning, of 
consultative or indicative nature, need for 
this and for government department to create 
national plan, need to plan imports and exports.
Corporatism
(Special subcategory where needed, especially 
Canada, Netherlands.)
Protectionism: Positive
Favourable mention of extension or maintenance 







































































































Economic Goals, Policy non-specific 
General statements of intent to pursue any 
economic goals that are policy non-specific.
Keynsian Demand Management
Adjusting government expenditure to prevailing 
levels of employment and inflation.
Productivity
Need to encourage or facilitate greater pro­
duction, need to take measures to aid this, 
appeal for greater production, and import­
ance of productivity to the economy, increase 
foreign trade, special aid to specific sectors 
of the economy, growth, active manpower policy, 
aid to agriculture, tourism and industry.
Technology and Infrastructure
Importance of modernising industrial administr­
ation, importance of science and technological 
developments in industry, need for training and 
government sponsored research, need for overhaul 
of capital equipment, and methods of communica­
tions and transport (including Merchant Marine), 
development of Nuclear Engergy.
Controlled Economy
General need for direct government control of 
economy, control over prices, wages, rents, etc. 
This covers NEITHER Nationalisation, nor Indicat­
ive planning.
Nationalisation
Government ownership and control, partial or 
complete, including government ownership of 
land.
Economic Orthodoxy and Efficiency 
Need for traditional economic orthodoxy, eg, 
balanced budget, retrenchment in crisis, low 
taxation, thrift and savings, support for trad­
itional economic institutions like the Stock 






























































































Categories DOMAIN 5: WELFARE AND QUALITY OF LIFE
501 Environmental Protection 
Preservation of countryside, forests 
etc, general preservation of natural 
resources against selfish interests, 
proper use of national parks, soil banks 
etc.
502 Art, Sport, Leisure, and Media 
Favourable mention of leisure activities, 
need to spend money on museums, art gal­
leries etc., need to encourage worthwhile 
leisure activities, and to provide cultural 
and leisure facilities, to encourage devel­
opment of the media, etc.
503 Social Justice
Need for fair treatment of all, for special 
protection for exploited, fair treatment 
in tax system, need for equality of oppor­
tunity, need for fair distribution of res­
ources and removal of class barriers, end 
of discrimination.
504 Social Services Expansion: Positive 
Favourable mention of need to maintain or 
expand any basic service or welfare scheme, 
and support for free basic social services 
such as public health, or housing. THIS 
EXCLUDES EDUCATION.
505 Social Services Expansion: Negative
506 Education: Pro-Expansion
507 Education: Anti-Expansion
DOMAIN 6: FABRIC OF SOCIETY
601 Defence of National way of Life: Positive 
Favourable mentions of importance of 
defence against subversion, necessary 
suspension of some freedoms in order to 
defend this, support o^ rational ideas, 
traditions and institutions.









































































































Favourable mention of, eg, censorship, supres- 
sion of immorality and unseemly behaviour, 
maintenance and stability of family.
Traditional Morality: Negative
Law and Order
Enforcement of all laws, actions against organ­
ised crime and terrorism, putting down urban 
violence, support and resources for police, 
tougher attitutdes in courts etc.
National Effort/Social Harmony
Appeal for national effort and solidarity, need 
for nation to see itself as united, appeal for 
public spiritedness, decrying anti-social 
attitudes in a time of crisis, support for 
public interest, national interest, bipartisan­
ship .
Communalism, Pluralism, Pillarization: Positive 
Preservation of autonomy of religious, ethnic, 
linguistic heritages within the country.
Communalism, Pluralism, Pillarization: Negative
DOMAIN 7; SOCIAL GROUPS
Labour Groups
Favourable references to Labour, working class, 
unemployed poor, support for Labour Unions, 
free collective bargaining, good treatment of 
manual and other employees.
Agriculture and Farmers
Support for agriculture, farmers, any policy 
aimed specifically at benefitting these.
Other Economic Groups
Underpriviledged Minority Groups
705 Non-Economic Demographic Groups 




























































































find that the party positions changed almost at random from 
one election to the next, as might be the case in a system 
dominated by parties which placed no premium on questions 
of policy or ideology per se, but which, motivated only 
by a desire for office, subordinated everything to the 
need to maximise their electoral appeal. Finally, it could 
even be the case that the issue dimensions themselves changed 
substantially over time, and that those derived from a study 
of elections in the early part of a given period would differ 
significantly from those derived from a study of the latter part 
of the period, while both could in turn differ from those 
dimensions derived, as in this case, from the period taken as 
a whole.
In the Irish case, it is the first of these problems which 
would appear at first sight to present the most difficulty; 
despite the generally held view of the Irish party system as 
one dominated by a nationalist cleavage (see below), 
nationalist rhetoric as such appears to play a very minimal 
role in the programmes of the various parties: as can be 
seen in table 2, the category which covers statements in 
favour of Irish unity (102) accounts for only 2 per cent 
of sentences in Irish manifestos. The case of Fianna Fail is 
of particular interest here, since it is the party which is 
generally reckoned to gain the most from appeals to nationalist 
sentiment; yet, taking the post-war period as a whole, we 
find that only 2.1 per cent of sentences in the party programmes 
specify support for Irish unity, and the topic barely registers 
in those programmes from the earlier part of the period (1948— 
1961). The category of traditional morality (603), which arguably 
may also express a facet of nationalist ideology, again counts 
for a negligible proportion of the party's statements, averaging 
only 0.1 per cent for the post-war period as a whole. Indeed, 
the only category which ddes register reasonably highly within 




























































































considered as part of some general appeal to nationalism, 
is that of national effort and social harmony (606), a 
category which covers appeals to voters to act in the 
national interest and in a way which reinforces national 
solidarity. But here the appeal is to Irish unity in social 
rather than territorial terms.
The relative absence of explicit appeals to nationalism is 
particularly surprising given what are identified in the 
literature as being the main cleavages in contemporary Irish 
politics. The most recent - and largely intuitive - attempt 
to specify these cleavages suggests that the primary conflict 
is that of 'strong vs. weak' nationalism, with 'planned vs. 
market economy' as the second major dimension (Cohan 1982, 
p. 269). In a similar vein, Basil Chubb's pioneering study 
of Irish politics identified a version of the nationalist 
cleavage as the dominant opposition, with secondary cleavages 
being expressed in terms of left vs. right and town vs. 
country (Chubb 1971, pp. 58-60). Yet another study, this time 
based on a survey of the attitudes of party activists in a 
Dublin constituency in the early 1970s, found that a 'territorial 
nationalism' dimension explained a substantial proportion of 
the variation in responses, though this time the dominant 
dimension was one identified as 'pluralism/clericalism'. A 
third, less significant dimension, 'anti-capitalist radicalism', 
was also identified, and can be seen as a version of 'left vs. 
right' (Garvin 1974, pp. 321-322). But it should also be 
noted that in this case the attitude questions were formulated 
on the basis of six hypothesised issue areas which were 
themselves biased towards a nationalism-emphasising interpretation 
of Irish political cleavages. These issue-areas were Law and 
Order/IRA; Cultural Nationalism; Sexual Puritanism; Anti­
secularism; Territorial Nationalism, and Economic Liberalism 




























































































In general, therefore, there appears to be substantial agreement 
that the main cleavage in Irish politics is one based on 
nationalism, while the more conventional left-right opposition 
finds expression only as a secondary conflict. In terms of 
party politics, the main cleavage is seen to divide the two 
largest parties, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, while Labour 
opposes both Fianna Fail and Fine Gael along the secondary, 
left-right dimension. But if this is the case, why should there 
be so little explicit reference to nationalist appeals in Irish 
party programmes?
One possible explanation could be sought in the nature of the 
party programmes themselves. Manifestos and surrogates such 
as party leaders' speeches, radio broadcasts and so on, can 
be seen as expressions of reasonably short-term policies. They 
represent the views of the parties as to what should be done 
in the four- to five-year lifetime of the next Dail (i.e. 
parliament). Nationalist appeals,on the other hand, are of 
a more long-term character in Ireland, in that they express 
essentially timeless aspirations to 'eventual' national unity, 
a dim and distant prospect which few Irish politicians would 
even envisage occuring in their lifetimes. As such, there is 
really little to be said about it, even,or perhaps especially, 
in manifestos and election statements.
A related explanation would be that explicit nationalist 
appeals play little role in party programmes simply because such 
appeals are almost inevitably devoid of policy content. Short 
of sponsoring a campaign of violence against the majority in 
Northern Ireland, there is little any of the parties can do 
to actually advance the cause of unity in any practical way. 
Commitment to unity ultimately remains an aspiration, however 
widely felt or intense it may be, and the expression of that 
commitment inevitably remains largely rhetorical. To be sure, 
the recrudescence of violence in Ulster at the end of the 1960s 
vastly increased the salience of the issue of Irish unity in 



























































































constitutional change appeared much were likely. But if it 
then seemed more plausible to speak of the creation of a 
32-county Republic within a matter of decades rather than 
of generations - and hence the increased space devoted by 
Fianna Fail to statements in favour of unity in the 1965-81 
period as against the 1948-61 period (see table 2) - the 
manifesto rhetoric remained just rhetoric. There was little 
to promise voters beyond simply a willingness to reassert 
the commitment to justice in Northern Ireland itself, and the 
eventual territorial unity of the island as a whole. In 1977, 
for instance, Fianna Fail were content to emphasise that a 
central aim of the party 'is to secure by peaceful means, the 
unity and idependence of Ireland as a democratic Republic. We 
totally reject the use of force as a means of achieving this 
aim. Any progress on the lines suggested in Fianna Fail's 
policy statement on the North, published in 1975, would add 
greatly to the impact of our economic strategy by promoting 
confidence both North and South and facilitating a return to 
a normal economic and tourist environment'(1977 Manifesto, 
p. 44). Even by the relative standards of conventional party 
programmes, such a statement is striking in its sheer blandness. 
Nor is it a statement which would have been a point of contention 
with the other parties. This was the era of bipartisanship on 
Northern Ireland, and even if one of the parties could have 
developed a specific policy content to accord with the 
traditional aspiration to unity, it is unlikely that its 
opponents would have found in that policy a possible source of 
convention. Nor was Northern Ireland a major issue in the minds 
of the voters: despite the seriousness of the conflict, the 
post-1968 violence had tended to remain north of the border, 
and Irish voters preferred to worry about inflation and 
unemployment (Rose et al 1978, p. 36). More 
recently, as a somewhat demoralised Fianna Fail under the 



























































































Fine Gael led by Garret Fitzgerald, the Republic's policy 
towards the North has become a reasonably serious point of 
contention between the parties. But this is a phenomenon of 
the 1982 elections, particularly that of November 1982, and 
it falls outside the current scope of this particular analysis.
The long-term character of the issue, and its largely 
rhetorical nature therefore afford two possible explanations 
for the absence of explicit nationalist appeals in Irish 
party programmes. To these could be added a further explanation 
based on the very consensual nature of the unity issue - at 
least until very recently. All three parties pledge themselves 
in favour of Irish unity as a basic political principle to 
the extent that this commitment is reflected even in the full 
titles of Fianna Fail (viz Fianna Fail - the Republican Party) 
and Fine Gael (viz Fine Gael - the United Ireland Party). The 
Republics claim to territorial jurisdiction over Northern 
Ireland is also enshrined in articles 2 and 3 of Bunreacht na 
hEireann, the Irish constitution. The nationalist appeal is 
in this sense a given, an accepted piece of political wisdom 
as entrenched as the commitment to parliamentary democracy 
itself. And to this extent that it is a given, the parties can 
take such an appeal for granted, hardly needing to concern 
themselves with a repeated stressing of the national aspiration. 
Fine Gael is perhaps somewhat of an exception here: as the 
successor of Cumann na nGaedheal, the party which accepted the
1921 Treaty with Britain and Dominion Status within the British 
Commonwealth; and as the party which contained a significant 
body of opinion hostile to Ireland's neutrality during World 
War II, Fine Gael has always been seen to be slightly suspect 
on the national question. Hence, I feel, the relative stress 
which the party has laid on statements supportive of Irish 
unity in its election programmes. Conversely Fianna Fail, and 
also Labour to an extent, could more easily take for granted 



























































































statements barely figure in the 1948-61 Fianna Fail and 
Labour programmes, yet register an average of almost 4 
per cent in Fine Gael programmes (cf table 2) . It is thus 
interesting to note that Fine Gael, traditionally regarded 
in Ireland as the 'softest' party on the national question, 
is at the same time the party which records the highest 
proportion of references to Irish unity in the period as a 
whole •
This, and the other points which have been advanced to 
explain the relative lack of emphasis on explicit nationalist 
appeals in Irish party programmes, may seem an overly lengthy 
exposition of what might appear to non-Irish readers as a 
fairly minor point. Yet at the same time it does indicate a 
very crucial aspect of manifestos as guides to party ideology, 
insofar as we can suggest that (a) because an issue lacks a 
specific policy application; or (b) because the consensus 
on the issue is so widespread; or (c) because support for the 
issue is so ingrained that it can be taken for granted, 
significant components of a party's ideology may rarely find 
expression in the cold print of election programme s .These are more 
general points which should be borne in mind concerning the 
usefulness of employing election programmes as sources for the 
study of party ideology. At the same time, however, in the 
Irish case, the absence from party programmes of an issue 
considered by many to be of crucial importance, may have an 
alternative and indeed much simpler explanation, i.e. that 
appeals to nationalism have played an insignificant role in 
electoral mabilisation in post-war Ireland. However important 
such appeals might seem when one sets out to define the 
historical differences between the parties, their absence from 
the election programmes suggests that these appeals are no 
longer relevant to contemporary political alignments. If this 
is the case, then it is mistaken to assert that one still finds 





























































































The nationalist explanation is maintained, however, due to 
the persistence of the view that the main political opposition 
in post-war Ireland has been that of Fianna Fail vs. Fine 
Gael. If party competition in post-war Ireland is seen in 
these terms, then one is almost inevitably drawn towards 
an explanation which emphasises intra-nationalist divisions 
as the basis of the division? there is simply little else 
ofsubstance with which to distinguish these two essentially 
conservative parties. If, on the other hand, and as argued 
elsewhere (Mair 1979), the primary opposition is seen to 
be Fianna Fail vs. all other parties, including both Fine Gael 
and Labour, then the nationalist explanation makes less substantive 
sense. While Fianna Fail may be in a position to play the green 
card when confronting Fine Gael on its own, it can do so with 
much less plausibility when confronting the combined, coalitional 
opposition of Fine Gael, Labour and other minor parties. And if 
this latter confrontation is taken as the primary 
opposition in post-war Ireland, then we must seek an alternative 
issue-basis for party competition. One such alternative has 
already been hypothesised in terms of an opposition based on 
'ability to govern' (Mair 1979), an opposition which finds 
expression in Fianna Fail's stress on the need for stable, 
single-party government (to be provided by Fianna Fail) as 
against the uncertainties of coalition (which Fianna Fail sees 
as the inevitable alternative to its own governance).
To conclude this section, we are therefore hypothesising that 
the main issue-dimension in post-war Irish politics is based 
on 'ability to govern', rather than on any persisting intra­
nationalist conflict. At the same time, and this time in 
accordance with the prevailing literature, it is also suggested 
that a secondary issue-dimension derives from a version of the 
traditional left-right cleavage. In terms of party alignments, 
we should expect to find that the first of these dimensions 
divides Fianna Fail from both Fine Gael and Labour, while the 
second should divide Fine Gael and Labour themselves, with 




























































































II. THE PARTY SYSTEM AND THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM
1. The Party System
Much of the relevant information on the Irish party system will 
be already apparent from the introductory section above. This 
section will therefore provide only a very brief outline, before 
going on to discuss - also briefly - the relevant characteristics 
of the governmental system. It should also be noted that there 
now exists quite a substantial literature on the Irish party 
system which can be easily consulted by readers (e.g. Carty 1981; 
Chubb 1969 & 1979; Gallagher 1976 & 1981; Garvin 1974,1977a & 1981a; 
Mair 1979; Manning 1972; O'Leary 1979; Rumpf and Hepburn 1977, and 
Whyte 1974).
As indicated above, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael - the two largest 
parties - owe their origins to Sinn Fein, the success of which in 
the 1918 Westminster election, and in subsequently establishing 
an alternative to the British regime, led to Irish independence. 
Party competition in the inter-war years was dominated by these 
two parties, Cumann na nGaedheal (later Fine Gael) holdina office 
until 1932 when it was replaced by Fianna Fail. Though the 
details need not concern us here, the period of the late 1920s 
and early 1930s saw a rapid polarisation of the party system, 
as smaller parties such as Labour and the Farmers Party lost 
votes to both Cumann na nGaedheal and Fianna Fail. From 1933 
onwards, however, Cumann na nGaedheal/Fine Gael itself began 
to lose support, such that by 1948 - the beginning of the period 
considered in this paper - the relative importance of the two 
larger parties had changed significantly. From being (semi) 
equivalent opponents in the late 1920s and early 1930s, by 
1948 Fianna Fail had established a clear electoral superiority 
over Fine Gael. Significantly, when Fianna Fail lost office 



























































































an inter-party coalition. Not since 1932 has another single 
party in Irish politics been in a position to replace Fianna 
Fail unaided by other parties (but this situation may now 
finally be changing). By 1948 we can see the effective 
institutionalisation of the new opposition setting Fianna 
Fail versus 'the Rest'. In short, we see the institutional 
confirmation of the emergence of a predominant party system 
(Mair 1 979) .
The Irish party system has remained relatively stable in the 
post-war period. The two minor parties which had risen during 
the 1940s, Clann na Talmhan and Clann na Poblachta, declined 
as quickly in the aftermath of the first coalition (in fact,
Clann na Talmhan's high point was reached in the 1944 election 
with 10 per cent of the vote; in 1948 it declined to 5 per 
cent), while the coalition experience proved sufficient to 
set Fine Gael on the road to electoral recovery. In 1951 Fine 
Gael's vote rose to 26 per cent, and to 32 per cent in 1954.
Though declining to 27 per cent in 1957, it increased again 
to 32 per cent in 1961 and to almost 37 per cent in 1981, the 
last election treated in this analysis. The vote won by 
Labour - the third party in the system - remained relatively 
stable in the period from 1948 to 1961, despite a brief 
decline in the 1957 election. After 1961, however, the party 
experienced a steady growth, particularly in the Dublin region: 
in 1965 Labour won 15 per cent of the vote (19 per cent in Dublin) 
as against only 12 per cent in 1961 (10 per cent in Dublin),
and 9 per cent in 1957 (8 per cent in Dublin). In 1969, 
the Labour vote reached 19 per cent, of which the Dublin 
proportion reached a record 28 per cent. Since then, however, 
the party was declined. A similar pattern of decline is shown 
by the minor parties and Independents, the total vote for which 
has not exceeded 10 per cent since 1957. Fianna Fail has 
remained particularly stable during the post-war period, with 




























































































Given the stability of the largest party, it is not 
surprising to find that the pattern of opposition has 
remained essentially unchanged since 1948. At that election,
Fianna Fail was replaced by a coalition government which 
received the support of all the other parties in the Dail, 
and, on the three subsequent occasions when Fianna Fail 
was defeated in 1954, 1973 and 1981, it was again replaced 
by coalitions receiving the support of all other Dail parties.
The only variation in this pattern, has been the changing 
composition and balance of the non-Fianna Fail group, which 
now consists of only two parties - Fine Gael and Labour. Whereas 
other non-Fianna Fail parties and Independents won 27 per cent 
of the vote in 1948, this figure had dropped to only seven per 
cent in 1977, with a corresponding change in the Rae fractionalsa- 
tion index from 0.75 to 0.65. Despite pursuing go-it-alone 
strategies in the post-1957 period, Labour and Fine Gael found 
themselves again reverting to a coalition strategy in 1973 in 
an effort to defeat Fianna Fail. That election saw a slight 
increase in the Fianna Fail vote, but the effective intra­
coalition transfer strategy of Fine Gael and Labour was 
sufficient to ensure a change of government for the first time 
in 16 years (Cohan et al, 1975). The coalition was itself 
defeated in the 1977 election when Fianna Fail was unexpectedly 
returned to power with an absolute majority of seats, while 


























































































2. The Governmental System
The Irish governmental system is largely similar to that of 
the UK, and is characterised by cabinet government and a 
bicameral legislature in which most of the power rests 
with the lower house - the Dail. The two systems do differ 
to the extent that Ireland has a written constitution; a 
proportional electoral system with multi member constituencies; 
an upper house - the senate - which is a primarily elected 
assembly (11 of the 60 seats are filled by appointees of the 
Taoiseach, i.e. prime minister) and which has a very restricted 
electorate organised in vocational and university panels; and 
an elective Head of State, the President, who in practice 
has very limited powers (Chubb 1971).
On a more informal basis, the most striking features of the 
Irish governmental system are the strength of the Cabinet 
(the executive) vis a vis the Dail (the lower house of the 
legislature),a very limited committee system and, in a related 
way, the tendency for individual TDs (i.e. MPs) to concern 
themselves with local constituency politics rather than national 
affairs, all of which combine to create a situation in which the Cabinet 
has a virtual monopoly in the introduction and passage of 
legislation (Chubb 1974). Despite the fact that four of the 
ten governments elected in the period between 1948 and 1981 
have been in minority positions, while a fifth (elected in 
1965) has controlled just exactly 50 per cent of Dail seats, 
on only two occasions has a government been forced to resign 
as the result of a Dail defeat. Both of these occasions 
concern the most recent governments, a Fine Gael-Labour minority 
coalition defeated on its budget proposals in January 1982, 
and a Fianna Fail minority government defeated in a vote of 
confidence in November 1982. With the exception of these two 
short-lived governments, the average duration in office of 
post-war governments has been three years and nine months.
Post-war Irish government has been dominated by Fianna Fail - 
which formed single - party administrations after six of the 




























































































three years and ten months). The non-Fianna Fail governments 
have been Fine Gael-led coalitions, together with Labour,
Clann na Talmhan and Clann na Poblachta in 1948 and 1954, 
and simply with Labour in 1973 and 1981 (average duration of 
two years and nine months). In terms of government formation, 
therefore, Ireland has been characterised by two very clear 
alternatives in the period under consideration: single party 
Fianna Fail government or coalitions involving all Dail 
parties other than Fianna Fail.
An earlier perusal of election advertisements and major election 
speeches suggests that much of party propaganda has been 
oriented around this Fianna Fail vs the Rest opposition (Mair 
1979), and hence the earlier hypothesis that the manifestos 
should reveal a similar type of emphasis. The advertisements 
and speeches concerned tended to be of the type in which 
Fianna Fail stressed the need for governmental stability, 
associated this stability with single-party government, and 
argued that it itself was the only party which could plausibly 
be seen to be able to provide such government. The response of 
the other parties, and particularly of Fine Gael, was often 
to assert that coalitions were the best form of government, 
since they were most effective at representing the diversity 
of Irish political opinion. As noted above, this dimension should 
become evident in the analysis of manifestos. What is less 
clear, however, is whether any other evidence might appear 
which would predict the Fine Gael-Labour coalition strategy.
On the face of it, it seems unlikely that such an alignment 
would be predicted by positions on the hypothesised, but 
secondary,left-right dimension: in terms of their traditional 
policies and their social bases of support, it hardly seems 
plausible to imagine that left-right placings would situate 
both Fine Gael and Labour on the same side of Fianna Fail 
On the contrary, the conclusions of the literature on Irish 
politics, as well as the more objective evidence of opinion 
surveys would suggest that the left-right dimension is the one 
most likely to divide Fine Gael and Labour, placing Fianna



























































































to pre-empt the evidence of the manifestos, which may indeed 
show a left-right Fine Gael-Labour alignment; or, 
alternatively, an alignment on the basis of an issue dimension 
wholly different from those hypothesised above.
The final point in this section concerns the specific effects 
of the electoral system on political competition. Irish 
elections are conducted with a type of proportional 
representation known as the Single Transferable Vote (STV), 
in which voters rank candidates nominated in multi-member 
constituencies on a 1, 2, 3 . ...N basis. While the details 
of STV need not concern us here (but see O'Leary 1979; Mair 
1982), nevertheless certain aspects are worth noting and have 
a bearing on any discussion of party manifestos. Of particular 
relevance is the tendency for the larger parties to nominate in 
any one constituency more candidates than they can hope to 
win seats. For a variety of reasons, a party which can hope 
to win only two seats in a four-seat constituency will 
nevertheless often nominate three or four candidates, with the 
result that the most intense electoral competition frequently 
takes place at intra- rather than at inter-party level; thus 
if Fianna Fail, for instance, is fairly well assured of 
winning two and only two seats in, say, constituency X, and 
yet nominates three candidates, then the most intense 
competition may be that which occurs between these three 
candidates over which two of the three actually gets to the 
Dail. None of the three may be inclined to compete directly 
with the Fine Gael candidates, since in this case it would 
be fairly certain that Fianna Fail could not gain an extra 
seat from that party, or lose one of its two assured seats.
To the extent that such intra-party rivalry dominates elections 
at the local level, then to that extent the manifesto or party 
programme is unimportant. Despite the recent emergence of 
pro- and anti-Haughey (the current party leader) wings in 
Fianna Fail (Garvin 1981b),there is no evidence to suggest 



























































































organised in terms of ideological or programmatic factions; 
policy as such plays no role in intra-party competition.
Rather, individual candidates compete with their fellow 
party nominees on the basis of their relative capacity to 
serve the constituency in a purely administrative sense.
Thus the particular policy of the party, while perhaps 
determining to some extent the degree of national swing between it 
and its opponent(s), will in many cases be much less influential 
in determining the fortunes of a particular candidate than 
would be his or her ability to act as a broker of the 
individual constituent's interests.
In this sense, individual candidates often pay little attention 
to overall party policy. Some may not even read the manifestos, 
and certainly many have no real interest in becoming involved 
in actually drawing up an electoral programme. The tendency is 
therefore one of delegation: programmes and their development 
become the unchallenged property of the senior leadership of 
the party and national headquarters, while the average 
candidate or backbench TD will at most acknowledge the receipt 






























































































1. Parties included in the analysis
In accordance with the practice adopted by the ECPR Research
Group on Party Programmes and Manifestos - of which this
particular work is part - the parties which should be
included in the analysis are those which count as 'relevant'
under the counting rules suggested by Sartori (1976, pp. 121-125).
In the Irish case in the period 1948-81, this would include
not only Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour, but also Clann
na Talmhan and Clann na Poblachta, both of which participated
in the first and second inter-party governments in 1948 and 
11954. In the following analysis, however, both of these 
smaller parties have been excluded. In part this is simply due 
to the difficulties involved in obtaining copies of their 
programmes, but their exclusion is also justified on the 
grounds that they faded from the political scene after the 
defeat of the second inter-party government in 1957.
2. The sources and their format
As can be seen from the bibliography of Irish manifestos (see 
below pp.93-94) the actual type of document used for this 
analysis varied substantially from one party to another as well 
as from one election to another, and as well as formally defined 
manifestos, the sources used include newspaper articles 
written by the party leaders, newspaper reports on programmes 
which were issued but which are now unobtainable, speeches 
by party leaders, short election addresses, and so on.
Of the three parties considered here, the sources for Labour 
are clearly the most authoritative. If we treat as formal 




























































































for the 1948 election, then the sources for Labour over the 
eight elections which it fought as a separate party include 
six authoritative statements of policy. Sources for the 
remaining two elections (1954 and 1961) are newspaper reports. 
This is particularly unfortunate in the 1961 case, since the 
very brief newspaper report of Labour's policy refers to 
the publication of a major 4,000 word election programme. It 
is not clear whether any formal programme was actually issued 
in the other case, that of 1954, and the source used here 
is an Irish Press report of a radio broadcast by Mr. Brendan 
Corish who later became party leader. In neither case is a 
manifesto appended to the relevant Annual Report of the party.
The Fine Gael sources include fewer formal statements of 
policy than do those for Labour. Actual manifestos have been 
obtained for the years 1961 to 1981 (these include the Fine 
Gael-Labour joint programmes in 1973 and 1977), and we have 
also used the Irish Independent article in 1948. For 1951,
1954 and 1957, however, the sources are less reliable, and 
again it is unclear whether no manifesto was actually issued, 
or whether the formal documents are now simply unobtainable.
Of the three elections in question, the source for 1951 is 
arguably the least reliable, since it involves simply a 
four-page election leaflet issued in a particular Dublin 
constituency, and it is not at all clear to what extent the 
policies to which it refers are formally approved party 
policies as against policies drawn up simply for that 
particular constituency. On the basis of the language and 
terms used in the leaflet, my own inclination is to believe 
that it is in fact a reprint of formal party policy. If this 
is the case, then the only problem may be that it is not 
comprehensive, and that certain policy areas have been excluded 
for reasons of space. There is no mention of a policy on 
agriculture, for instance, which would normally be a 
surprising omission in a Fine Gael programme, particularly 



























































































in the context of this urban constituency. The sources for 
1954 and 1957 are newspaper reports of speeches by the party 
leader. In the former case, the speech covers the 'thirteen 
fundamental principles' of Fine Gael policy and in the 
latter 'sixteen reasons' why voters should support Fine Gael. 
Both reports seem to be comprehensive accounts of election 
policy.
Despite the size and importance of the party, the sources 
for Fianna Fail are unfortunately very inadequate. Formal 
statements of policy are available for only three of the ten 
elections - 1948 (the Irish Independent article), 1977 and 
1981. For the bulk of the period, i.e. from 1951 to 1973, 
we have had to rely on reported speeches, radio broadcasts, 
and so on. What is particularly unfortunate about this is that 
it is exactly this period which covers Fianna Fail's most 
successful years, in that it held government from 1951 to 
1954 and from 1957 to 1973. In an analysis of manifestos it 
is somewhat ironic to report that the most successful party 
has been the one to make least use of formal election 
programmes, but more of that later. For the moment, let us look 
briefly at the actual sources which have been used in lieu 
of formal manifestos.
The source for Fianna Fail in 1951 is an election leaflet 
issued for the constituency of West Galway. As in the case 
of the Dun Laoighaire leaflet used as a Fine Gael source in 
1951 (see above), it is not at all clear how much of this 
document was local work and how much was prepared by national 
party headquarters and, as in the case of Fine Gael in 1951, 
it is therefore not clear to what extent these and only 
these policies were advanced in all parts of the country. The 
leaflet itself has a preamble which refers to the national 
situation, as well as two pages reporting Fianna Fail 
achievements while in office, and promising a continuation 
of these policies if returned to office in 1951. The 1954 source 
is more authoritative, being the text of a radio broadcast by 



























































































reasonably good source, being an almost verbatim account of 
a major speech on policy, again by Sean Lemass. That of 1961 
is the (seemingly) verbatim account of a radio broadcast by 
Lemass (then party leader), while the source for 1965 is 
again an almost verbatim speech by Lemass - this time to 
party workers in Dublin.The 1969 source is less satisfactory 
since, although it is the speech given by the then party 
leader (Jack Lynch) to officially open the campaign, it 
seems to be reported in relatively abbreviated form. Finally, 
the 1973 source is the least satisfactory of all, comprising 
simply a short statement given by Jack Lynch on the dissolution 
of the Dail. Despite a very time-consuming search, it proved 
impossible to find any reasonably comprehensive statement of 
Fianna Fail policy in this election, either in the form of 
newspaper reports of speeches or of radio or television 
broadcasts. Somewhere, to be sure, there must exist the text 
of such a speech; unfortunately, however, I was unable to 
find it. Given the inadequacy of the 1973 source, therefore, 
it has been excluded from the factor analysis which is 
reported later in this paper.
Though the sources therefore vary between parties as well as
.between elections, nevertheless those chosen for the analysis
nearly always do seem to represent comprehensive statements
of policy which are arguably as authoritative as can now be
found in a country which has a very well developed sense of
2history but a very poorly developed sense of archives.
Yet when the parties do set about producing a formal manifesto, 
the results are quite striking. Fianna Fail's first formalised 
programme since the war - Manifesto: Action Plan for National 
Reconstruction - published in 1977, is an impressive, A4- 
sized document of 47 pages, with a cover in the traditional 
green, white and orange colours. In 1981, the party improved 
even on this, with a 68-page A4 document which was actually 




























































































green, white and orange cover, and the type of shiny, 
expensive pages which one normally associates only with 
sophisticated magazines. Fine Gael is almost as impressive.
While its 1961 manifesto is simply four printed A4 pages, 
crammed with poorly laid out information, lacking a cover, 
and graced only by a photograph of the then leader, James 
Dillon, the 1965 manifesto is extremely professional: this 
time a printed 30-page A5 pamphlet, it is nicely designed, 
and clearly so impressed its authors that they decided 
to take advantage of what they believed would be a heavy demand, 
and actually charged a shilling a copy. In 1969, the party 
again issued a pamphlet sized policy (28 pages), this time 
free of charge, but with a brightly coloured green, white and 
orange cover. By 1973, however, pressures of time and the need 
to negotiate hastily with Labour led to a simple, cyclostyled 
three-page document, distribution of which was left to 
newspaper coverage. Pressures of time also hindered production 
of the 1977 Fine Gael-Labour programme - surprisingly in this 
ase, since they had been in government and were therefore 
responsible for calling the election - which was not distributed 
until twenty four hours after that of Fianna Fail. What the 
two parties did produce therefore showed all the signs of 
haste: a poorly produced, cyclostyled, 26-page foolscap­
sized booklet, full of typographical errors. Things had 
improved in 1981, however, with the production of a professional,
A4 booklet of 31 pages, one marked by a level of detail and 
precision which is normally most uncharacteristic of even 
the most professional party propaganda. Since the sources for most 
of the Labour programmes are various editions of the party's 
Annual Report, it is impossible to state what form they actually 
took at the time; given that the party is almost always 
chronically short of funds, however, it is unlikely that the 
earlier programmes differed substantially (except perhaps in 
terms of length) from the only original document included, 
that of 1981, which was a fairly clearly-typed, A4 sized, 61- 
page cyclostyled document, albeit with a multi-coloured cover; 





























































































3. The role of manifestos
One of the greatest difficulties in applying an analysis 
such as this to the Irish case is that of determining the 
role and importance of manifestos and party programmes.
Unlike in Britain or even the U.S. (Kavanagh 1981), there 
is no manifesto 'tradition' and what importance does 
currently attach to Irish election programmes is largely a 
product of the 1970s, and the relatively high impact achieved 
by the coalitions 14-point programme in 1973 (the 'statement 
of intent') and the now famous Fianna Fail manifesto of 1977.
The lack of a traditional emphasis on manifestos derives from 
a number of factors, most notably the relatively high level of 
non-policy oriented intra-party competition (see above); 
the formerly quite prevalent belief that the vast bulk of the 
electorate had already made up their minds how to vote and 
that the central problem facing party strategists was partisan 
mobilisation rather than conversion; and, finally, the lack 
of an emphasis on manifestos on the part of Fianna Fail, 
electorally the most successful party in the state.
Yet despite the traditional lack of emphasis on manifestos, 
commentaries on the post-war Irish party system do tend to 
identify particular watersheds in terms of the particular 
party programmes issued at different elections. Three programmes 
can be seen to be of special significance in this sense - that 
of Fine Gael in 1965, that of Labour in 1969 and that of Fianna 
Fail in 1977. In its own way, each marked a particular turning 
point in the history of the three parties. The earliest 
chronologically was that of Fine Gael, known as the Just 
Society programme, and is seen to mark the final transformation 
of Fine Gael from being the traditional party of privilege and 
social conservatism to being a party with strong commitments 
to welfarism, albeit still from a largely conservative stand­
point. Thus studies of Irish politics tend to speak of a pre- 




























































































organisation which still bore the standard of the old 
Irish propertied classes and large farmers, the latter a more 
liberal, mass-oriented party with a strong commitment to the 
growing Irish welfare state. In fact, however, a comparison 
of the 1961 and 1965 programmes reveals that much of this 
apparent U-turn was largely rhetorical: while the long preamble 
devoted a lot of space to the need for social justice and an 
expansion of the welfare state, much of the actual policy 
proposals were simply reprinted from the earlier 1961 programme. 
Certainly Fine Gael had changed, but a careful analysis of the 
programmes reveals that much of the change was already 
apparent in 1961.
The 1969 watershed in Labour's case was not so specifically 
tied to the party programme of that year as to the New Republic 
address by Brendan Corish, the party leader, in 1967 (Corish 
1968), and to the subsequent Outline Policy published in 1969.
Both of these interventions marked a major attempt by the party 
to shift to the left of the Irish political spectrum, and both 
were marked by a - now evidently unjustified - optimism con­
cerning Labour's future as a majority party of government in 
the 1970s. Labour's slogan then, a slogan drawn from the Corish 
address and the Outline Policy, and repeated in the 1969 mani­
festo, was "Let's Build a New Republic"; less evident, but 
treated with no less commitment, was the catch-phrase "The 
Seventies will be Socialist." The very language of Labour 
politics in the latter half of the 1960s, no less than the new 
found optimism about a future Labour Government, was a wholly 
new element in Irish mass politics. As two contemporary 
commentators noted, the change from 1965 was striking: whereas 
the earlier manifesto comprised 'a connection of unrelated 
proposals aimed not at a revolutionary reconstruction of Irish 
society and economy but rather at the more efficient and 
egalitarian working of certain aspects of the existing structure', 
that of 1969 'was openly based on a socialist view of the Irish 
economy' (Busteed and Mason 1970, p. 374). Yet again, however, 




























































































analysis reveals that much of the change was rhetorical, 
and that in some respects the specific proposals of Labour 
in 1969 were less radical than those of earlier years (see 
below, figure 7 ). But this is not to deny the very crucial
impact of language and rhetoric, and the undeniable fact the 
Labour in 1969 was seen to be moving to the left.
The third significant manifesto in this period was that of 
Fianna Fail in 1977, significant less for any change in the 
party's ideological position (if such could be defined), but 
rather for the introduction of a wholly new style of Fianna 
Fail electoral strategy. This was, after all, the first formal 
man tfe sto which the party had issued since the war, and if 
nothing else was an indication that the leadership had come 
to believe in the presence of a sizeable floating vote which 
could be won over by particular policy pledges. The pledges 
in this case were clear-cut and simple, and indeed the manifesto 
was marked by a specificity and directness as well as by a 
level of state-sponsored generosity which left the party's 
opponents gasping: rates on domestic dwellings were to be 
abolished; road tax on cars was to be abolished, and first-time 
buyers of new houses were to be given a grant of b 1,000.
Against the predictions of all commentators, Fianna Fail not 
only won an overall majority of seats in this election, but 
also achieved a higher percentage of the vote than at any 
election since the war. According to the then party leader,
Jack Lynch, the reason for the change of strategy was simple: 
in 'the old days one was either pro- de Valera (the founder 
of Fianna Fail,and its leader until 1959 when he was succeeded 
by Sean Lemass) or anti- de Valera, or pro-Lemass or anti- 
Lemass, or neither, and then one supported Labour. But these 
days were gone'7*
In other words, there now (or since the early 1970s) existed 
an available electorate which had to be actively wooed rather 




























































































Lynch also remarked that the 1977 programme was also
in part a response to the perceived success of the coalition 
parties' 'Statement of Intent' in 1973, a document which 
arguably also could be included in the list of particularly 
important election programmes. In this case, however, the 
coalition's proposals were significant not for their content 
or even for the style with which they were presented, but rather 
because they marked the first time that Labour and Fine Gael 
had actually run on a joint programme, instead of simply 
hammering out a set of compromise policies in the event of 
their being returned with a governing majority.
5
4. The impact of the manifestos
The Irish case also presents immense difficulties in determining 
the contemporary impact of the various manifestos, in that there 
are so few studies of the elections prior to the 1970s, and 
so little survey evidence prior to 1969, that any judgements 
in this area must perforce be very tentative. The Just Society 
proposals of Fine Gael are a good case in point. Though 
retrospectively seen by commentators to mark a major turning 
point in the history of the party, the evidence for any 
contemporary impact is slight. Certainly Fine Gael's national 
vote increased, but only by slightly more than 2 per cent. 
Questioned afterwards about the impact of the proposals, the 
then chairman of the drafting committee and later party leader, 
Liam Cesgrave, could say only that the eventual document was 
'certainly very detailed'.^ A study written subsequent to the 
publication of the Just Society proposals noted that the 1965 
election was called before the committee discussions could 
be concluded, and that the proposals as such never really 




























































































One party worker at the time is quoted as saying that 
'there was not always a clear Fine Gael position on some 
issues, so in writing speeches we would simply try to hammer 
out our own policy. When the belatedly-issued copies of the 
Just Society reached us, we sometimes found that statements 
in it were in contradiction to positions our candidate, or 
other party candidates, had already taken' (Kenny 1 972, p. 403) .
There is clearer evidence of the impact - or at least fairly 
widespread knowledge - of new policies in the case of Labour's 
1969 programme and that of Fianna Fail in 1977. In the former 
case, a 1969 survey found that 20 per cent of respondents - 
including 19 per cent of Fine Gael supporters and 17 per cent 
of Fianna Fail supporters - had heard of Labour's new policies; 
what was less welcome news for Labour was that, of those who 
had heard, 42 per cent disapproved as against only 37 per cent 
who approved (Kenny 1972, p. 129). More detailed evidence 
drawn from private polls commissioned by Fine Gael concerning 
the impact of the programmes in 1977 shows that 76 per cent 
of respondents were aware of the publication of the Fianna Fail 
manifesto, as against 62 per cent awareness of the coalition 
manifesto (later in the campaign this increased to 80 per cent 
and 70 per cent respectively), while 27 per cent believed Fianna 
Fail's tantalising promises, as against 24 per cent who 
believed the more sombre proposals of the coalition. Respondents 
also tended to say that, though attractive, the Fianna Fail 
proposals would not be possible to implement (56 per cent), while 
the coalitions proposals, though less attractive, were more 
possible to implement (57 per cent). In general, however, 
voters felt that past performance (64 per cent) was more 
important than campaign promises (29 per cent) in ensuring a 
party's victory.
The manifesto per se is arguably less important in terms of 
mass impact than are election leaflets published by the parties 
and which are sent to every voter on the register. These leaflets 
normally include an address by the party leader, a brief summary 




























































































candidates. The normal practice seems to be that party 
Headquarters prints most of the leaflet and then supplies 
it to the constituency organisers, who print in local details 
before distribution. These leaflets tend to be colourful, 
glossy and stylish, and the parties regularly distribute them 
in the one free mailing to which they - or, more properly, 
the candidates - are entitled by law. Again, the normal practice 
seems to be that the policy proposals on the leaflets are drawn 
from the manifesto, and it is in this sense that the manifesto 
car. be said to have its widest, albeit quite indirect, impact.
Yet even here there are often problems. The Labour party, for 
instance, accurately described by one commentator
as 'being in the nature of a loosecoalition of like-minded but 
independent TDS1 (Manning 1972, p. 80), suffered immense problems 
in 1969, when some of its rural candiates decided not to use 
the. election leaflet which had been drawn up by party headquarters 
since it had been couched in much the same socialist rhetoric 
as the 1969 programme itself. Indeed, judging from interviews 
with Labour party election strategists, this is one of the 
party's more serious problems, in that many of the more con­
servative rural deputies prefer to seek re-election largely on 
their own terms rather than as standard- bearers of a more 
radical-sounding Labour party policy.
Fianna Fail also has had problems regarding the local acceptance 
or replication of its national policies, though in this case it 
may be simply a feature of the long-term lack of a formal party 
manifesto. One case in point was an incident which occured 
during the 1973 campaign, which had been opened by the coalition 
parties' 'Statement of Intent' which had promised, inter alia 
the progressive reduction of rates on property. In response to 
this, in the closing stages of the campaign, Jack Lynch announced 
that Fianna Fail would immediately abolish all rates. A couple 
of days later, however, an advertisement on behalf of the local 
Fianna Fail candidates appeared in the Limerick Leader, the 
main burden of which was to state that the coalition was foolish 
to propose the progressive reduction of rates since this would 
be too costly in terms of the national budget (O'Leary 1979, pp. 78-79). 




























































































local party organisation before Lynch's new policy was 
announced, yet either lack of internal party communication or 
simply oversight had allowed its publication to go ahead.
Certainly at that time, admitted Lynch, there was very limited 
supervision by headquarters of what local party candidates were
gsaying to the voters.
In general, however, it is very difficult to assess the impact 
of programmes, whether they derive from formal manifestos, 
leaflets or simply new policies which emerge during the campaign, 
Interviews with Liam Cosgrave of Fine Gael, and Eoin Ryan, then 
national director of elections for Fianna Fail, tend to suggest 
that both parties normally favour short, snappy manifestos, 
since then any message can be got across more easily. According 
to Ryan, for instance, the 1981 Fianna Fail programme was 
simply 'too long', while certainly that of Fine Gael in the 
same election read somewhat like an university textbook in 
national economics.
Of all the post-war programmes, the two with possibly the 
greatest impact were those of Fianna Fail in 1977 - which surely 
must have contributed to its record post-war vote- and of the 
coalition parties in 1973, this latter if only because it 
legitimated the alliance of the two parties and thereby 
substantially increased the rate with which lower preference 
Fine Gael votes transferred to Labour, and those of Labour to 
Fine Gael (Cohan et al 1975) .
The coalition's 1973 programme was also perhaps the most widely 
distributed, being reprinted in full by all three national dailies. 
But with this single exception, it otherwise has proved impossible 
to get any reliable figures on the print-runs and distribution 
of any of the manifestos prior to 1981. In that particular 
election, Fianna Fail printed 12,000 copies of its programme.
These were then distributed on a geographical basis, with 200 
going to each of the 41 constituencies, and the remainder going 
to individuals, journalists, etc. Fine Gael printed 10,000 copies 
of its programme, which went to party members, journalists and 





























































































programme, though how these were distributed is unclear. Labour 
printed only 1,000 copies of its 1981 manifesto, and these 
were distributed to the media, as well as one copy to each 
branch of the party, each director of elections, and each 
candidate. Labour also published 2,000 summaries, distributing 
three or four to each of its branches.
5, How the manifestos are prepared
Given the lack of available information, this section must
perforce be particularly brief. As noted earlier, the lack of
concern for national party policy shown by many backbench
TDs effectively allows the party leadership a free hand in
devising election programmes. Certainly, it is a very informal
process, and none of the parties' constitutions lays down any
procedures which must be followed. Fine Gael's Just Society
proposals, for instance, were essentially drafted by one man,
Declan Costello, a leading liberal in the party, nominal
responsibility for the programme being given to a committee under
the chairmanship of Liam Cosgrave, then a moderate pro-reformist
and senior figure in the party, but one who was also politically
acceptable to the more conservative wing of Fine Gael. Normally,
Fine Gael's manifestos go before the Oireachtas (i.e. Dail and
Senate) party before publication but, as has already been noted
in the case of the Just Society, even this need not be a pressing
requirement. A similar situation occurred in 1981, when the
parliamentary party did not see the Fine Gael manifesto, which
itself was drafted by a small committee of party notables , until9it. was too late to make any changes.
In the case of the Labour party, the Administrative Council 
(i.e. party executive) authorises the party leaders (Chairman, 
leader of the parliamentary party, secretary, etc.) to write 
the manifesto, and then approves it afterwards. In the case of 
the two coalition programmes (1 973 and 1 977) , this party control 




























































































were involved in the discussions leading to the joint
'Statement of Intent' in 1973, the drafting was actually
carried out primarily by Brendan Corish (leader) and James Tully
(deputy leader) of the Labour party, and Liam Cosgrave (leader)
and Tom O'Higgins (deputy leader) of Fine Gael. The coalition
manifesto of 1977 was similarly drafted by representatives of
both parties; in this case, however, the final approval was
carried out by the Cabinet Ministers, rather than the parliamentary
parties or even the party executives, with the alleged result
that a number of the major 'spending' and possibly election-
10winning proposals were dropped at the last moment. In 1981 
the Labour programme was drawn up two weeks before the election 
}Dy the party's campaign committee, consisting of the party 
leader, deputy leader, the general secretary, financial secretary, 
party chairman, national director of elections and the press 
officer.
The making of the Fianna Fail manifesto of 1977 was a much longer 
process. Following the party's defeat in 1973, Jack Lynch invited 
a number of 'experts' - including Martin O'Donoghue, then 
professor of economics in Trinity College, Dublin, and later 
a TD and Minister for Finance in the 1977 Fianna Fail government - 
to his home in order to establish a party 'Think-Tank'. A 
series of policy committees were then established, and these 
liaised with corresponding backbench committees in the Oireachtas; 
the policies which emerged from these groups than formed the 
basis of the manifesto. In 1981, however, the programme was 
devised simply by a Committee of Ministers.
In general, therefore, the procedure by which manifestos are 
drawn up seems to vary according to whether or not the party 
is in government at the time of the election. If the party is 
incumbent, then the tendency seems to be to rely on the cabinet 
members and thereby possibly to end up with a more cautious 
set of proposals; if it is not in government, the officers of 
the party, and/or the Oireachtas party tends to play a greater 
role. In any event, however, the procedure rarely - if ever - 
involves a wide range of party members. It is not a terribly 
open or democratic process, but then there seems very little 




























































































IV. WHAT IS SAID IN THE MANIFESTOS
1 . Coding procedures
Having looked at what are generally perceived to be the main
issue-dimensions in post-war Irish politics, as well as at
the reliability and importance of manifestos or their surrogates
as possible sources for an understanding of these issue-dimensions,
it is now necessary to look at what the manifestos themselves
actually say. First, however, it may be worth noting some of
the details of the coding procedures involved. In accordance
with the approach adopted by the ECPR research group as a
whole, the manifestos were coded into the 53 specified categories
(cf table 1 above), counting the quasi-sentence as the unit 
11of analysis. 'Empty' sentences, i.e. statements with no 
particular reference and which could not be classified into 
any of the coding categories, were obviously not coded, and the 
percentage of such sentences in the manifestos of each party 
for the period as a whole can be seen at the end of table 2. 
Separate subcategories were also initially introduced for the 
Irish case in the expectation that particular reference would 
be made to topics not included in the general coding scheme 
(e.g. appeals specifically directed towards small farmers, 
young people etc.), but in the event these proved to be 
unnecessary.
Also in accordance with the procedure adopted by the ECPR 
group as a whole, the final factor analysis normally did not 
include those categories which accounted for an average of less 
than 1 per cent in all manifestos unless these also accounted 
for an average of 3 per cent or more in the manifestos of any 
one party. In the Irish case, however, exceptions to this rule 
were made in the case of the categories of Nationalisation 
(413) and Law and Order (605). The former scored an average 
of only 0.7 per cent over all the manifestos, but registered 
an average of 2.6 per cent in the Labour manifestos, thus 
ranking it quite highly among the more mentioned categories 




























































































per cent over all manifestos, but scores an average of 1.5 
per cent in the Fine Gael programmes, and 2.2 per cent in the 
pre-1965 Fine Gael programmes, and is included on the grounds 
that it has formed quite an important component of that party's 
programmes.
Finally, it should be noted that the 53 categories have been 
divided into seven domains, viz External Relations Freedom 
and Democracy, Government, Economy, Welfare, Social Fabric, and 
Groups. (Figure 1 about here)
2. The domains over time
Figure 1 shows the relative weights accorded to each of the 
seven domains by the parties in each of the post-war elections;
1 2the relative percentage of noncoded sentences is also indicated. 
The first feature to be noted is that Irish manifestos in 
general tend to be dominated by concerns in just four of the 
domains: Government, Economy, Welfare and Groups. External 
relations in particular (including references to Irish unity 
and Britain), but also Freedom and Democracy and Social 
Fabric rarely figure with any prominence. These are also some 
very sharp changes between elections; in 1957, for instance, 
the election precipitated by the resignation of the second 
coalition, both the Government and Social Fabric domains 
receive a great deal more space in the manifestos at the cost 
of concerns with Economy and Welfare. Government enjoys a 
similar surge in 1973, when the coalition strategy was revived.
In this latter case, however, the change was wholly due to the 
relative weight of this domain in the Fianna Fail 'programme', 
which - as has already been noted - cannot really be treated 
as a proper manifesto and which has been excluded from the 
factor analysis presented below. It is also interesting to 
note the relative decline over time of the Groups domain, 























































































































































































earlier post-war elections, but which then declined in 
relative terms before increasing again in the 1977 election.
A somewhat different picture emerges if one looks at the 
domain percentages over time for each party. For reasons of 
space, the relevant graphs are not presented here, but they do 
show Labour as the most consistent of the three parties in the 
post-war period, with programmes generally dominated by the 
Economy and Welfare domains, and with an increasing emphasis 
on Government and a decreasing emphasis on Groups during the 
1960s and 1970s. Fine Gael displays a more erratic pattern: 
there is no mention of categories in the Welfare domain in 1948 
and 1957, for instance, while the latter programme also fails 
to refer to Groups, and devotes over 50 per cent of its content 
to questions of Government. Indeed, this particular programme, 
which came after the party's second period as the dominant 
partner in a non-Fianna Fail coalition, is clearly out of step 
with the average profile of post-war Fine Gael manifestos, and 
arguably should be excluded from the factor analysis which,as 
frill be seen below, also underlines its non-typicality.
X
The Fianna Fail pattern is also quite erratic, even if we 
exclude the 1973 programme. The Economy domain tends to dominate 
this party's programmes with Government also being very prominent, 
while the other domains are correspondingly squeezed. Welfare, 
for instance, received no mention in 1957, nor Social Fabric 
in either 1948 or 1957, nor Groups in 1961 or 1973. The omission 
of these latter two domains is particularly surprising since, 
as we shall see later, categories within them normally figure 
very prominently in the party's programmes. In the case of 
Fianna Fail, however, variations between elections are somewhat 
understandable given that we are often not dealing with formal, 
structured manifestos, but rather with speeches given by 




























































































One final point concerns the length of the manifestos. While 
inter-election comparisons are not possible in cases where no 
formal programme was issued, those cases which can be compared 
show a clearly discernible trend towards greater length.
Fianna Fail's 1981 programme,for instance, contains 1,707 
quasi-sentences, as against 482 in that of 1977. The four 
programm.es published by Fine Gael (the coalition programmes are 
excluded) between 1961 and 1981 increase from 174 quasi-sentences 
to 575 in 1965, 629 in 1969 and 1,219 in 1981. Though producing 
a lengthier manifesto in 1951 (95 quasi-sentences) than in
1957 (72), thereafter Labour's programmes also increase in 
size - to 280 in 1965, 589 in 1969 and 1,037 in 1981.
3. Categories and domains, 1948-81
The relative emphasis on each of the domains as well as on the 
original categories can also be seen from the data in table 2, 
which contrasts the 1948-61 average with that of 1965-81 for 
each of the parties, and also shows each party's average 
percentage of references by category and domain for the period 
as a whole. The periods have been divided partly on the simple 
basis that each includes five elections, and partly because 
the 1965 publication of Fine Gael's Just Society proposals is 
often seen as representing a watershed in post-war Irish politics
(Table 2 about here)
The first point to be noted about these data concerns the parties 
relative emphasis on domains over the post-war period as a whole, 
the first significant difference in which is that between 
f :anna Fail and Fine Gael on the one side, and Labour on the 
other, in the Government domain, both of the larger parties 
giving slightly more than twice as much weight to this domain 
as does Labour. A similar large versus small party contrast is 































































































































































































































































































































































































































of 23.4 per cent, as against 13.0 per cent and 13.9 per cent 
for Fianna Fail and Fine Gael respectively. Neither contrast 
is surprising: Fianna Fail as the only party capable of 
providing single-party government, and Fine Gael as the leading 
component of the non-Fianna Fail coalitions, have each an 
interest in stressing issues concerning Government as such. 
Labour's emphasis on welfare is also to be expected given 
its (admittedly very mild) socialist colouring. Other inter­
party contrasts are less striking: both Fine Gael and Labour 
tend to place more emphasis on Economy, Fianna Fail and Fine 
Gael on Social Fabric, and Fianna Fail and Labour on Groups.
The inter-period contrasts are also interesting, particularly 
in the light of the inter-party differences noted above.
Looking at the Government domain, for instance, we can see 
that Labour's emphasis on this area shows a marked increase 
in the 1965-81 period, an increase which reflects the party's 
late 1960s optimism about its future chances as a single-party 
government. Conversely, Fine Gael's emphasis on this area 
decreases during the later elections, to the extent that it 
more or less begins to reflect the Labour position more closely 
than that of Fianna Fail. The contrast in the Welfare domain is 
also striking: while both Fianna Fail and Labour maintain more 
or less the same degree of emphasis on Welfare, the Fine Gael 
figure almost doubles, going from 10.3 per cent in the early 
period to 20.2 per cent during the later elections. While a 
closer look at the figures on an election by election basis shows 
that this new Fine Gael emphasis on Welfare began in 1961 
rather than in 1965, nevertheless the inter-period contrast 
shown in table 2 is very striking. It is also interesting to 
note that there was a corresponding decline in Fine Gael emphasis 
on categories in the Social Fabric domain. Inter-period contrasts 
are also evident in the Groups domain, with both Fianna Fail 
and Labour evidencing marked declines of emphasis and Fine 




























































































A clearer picture of these contrasts emerges if we actually 
look at the categories which have changed. (A more detailed 
assessment of the actual content of these categories will be 
discussed below; suffice is for now to note the actual 
quantitative changes.) Labour's increased emphasis on 
government, for instance, stems primarily from its increased 
emphasis on Government Authority and Effectiveness (305), which 
accords with the earlier remarks on the party's new optimism.
At the same time, this is precisely where Fine Gael's decline 
in emphasis originates, as its average percentage of sentences 
concerning this category drops from 17.5 per cent in the first 
five elections to just 4.3 per cent in the second five, while 
there is a substantial increase in the party's emphasis on 
Government Efficiency (303). The Fianna Fail programmes also 
show an increase in the weight of Government Efficiency, and 
a slight decline in that of Government Authority and Effectiveness, 
a decline which would be even more pronounced if we exclude the 
abnormal score of the 1973 programme. Within the external domain, 
and as noted in the Introduction, Fianna Fail also registers a 
striking increase in the percentage of sentences in category 
102, which includes pro-Irish unity statements.
There are also some striking changes in the categories within 
the Economy domain. The Economy category which receives most 
prominence in Fianna Fail's programmes, for instance, Productivity 
(410) declines from 14.2 per cent to 9.6 per cent, though it 
remains the largest single category within the domain. The Fine 
Gael figures show a sharp decline in Enterprise (401) and, 
though to a lesser extent, Productivity, while the party increases 
its emphasis on Controlled Economy (412). In this sense, we can 
already see Fine Gael moving in a somewhat leftward direction, 
a tendency which indeed also becomes apparent from the factor 
analysis below. The only significant change in Labour's programmes 
is in the Productivity category which, as in the case of the 




























































































Fianna Fail's emphases within the Welfare domain remain fairly 
steady. Fine Gael on the other hand registers sharp increases 
in its emphasis on Social Justice (503) and Social Services 
Expansion: Positive (504), both of which actually decline in the 
Labour case. However, Labour does substantially increase its 
emphasis on what might be seen as 'post-materialist' welfare - 
Environmental Protection (501) and Art, Sport, Leisure, Media 
(502).
All three parties evidence a declining concern for National 
Effort/Social Harmony (606) in the Social Fabric domain, while 
Fianna Fail registers an almost wholly new emphasis on Defence 
of National Way of Life: Positive (601). The relative emphases 
on the categories otherwise remain more or less steady across 
all three parties. Finally, we can note that much of Fianna 
Fail and Labour's decline in emphasis in the Groups domain 
occurs as a result of a weaker emphasis on appeals to Labour 
Groups (701) and Agriculture and Farmers (702).
(Table 3 about here)
The data in table 2 also show that quite a number of issue 
areas appear largely irrelevant as far as the Irish manifestos 
are concerned. Table 3 lists these categories, all of which have 
been excluded from the factor analysis below, and none of which 
records an average score of more than 1 per cent. Categories 
within all seven domains are involved, but the exclusion rules 
primarily effect categories in the first domain - External 
Relations. Given Ireland's neutrality and the low level of 
importance attached to the need for military defence forces, 
most of the exclusions in the domain are unsurprising. The 
one exception may be that of Europe: Positive (108), which 
covers pro-EC statements and references. Yet of the three 
parties, only Fianna Fail has devoted any real space to this 
category, and even in this case the degree of emphasis is re­

































































































101 Relationship with Britain - Positive 1.05
103 Decolonisation .03
104 Military Positive .18
105 Military Negative 0
106 Peace . 12
107 Internationalism Positive . 34
108 Europe Positive . 34




203 Constitutionalism Positive .22
2041 Constitutionalism Negative .08
I 302 Decentralisation Negative .10
! 304 Govt. Corruption .54
. 405 Corporat ism 0
407 Protectionism Negative .11
i 408 Economic Goals Policy non-specific . 65
; 409 Keynsian Demand Management .01
i 505i Social Services Anti-Expansion .08
: 507| Education Anti-Expansion 0
! 602 Defence of Irish way of Life - Negative .29
: 603 Traditional Moralitv Positive .04
1 604 Traditional Morality Negative 0
j 607 Communalism and Pluralism - Positive 0
608 Communalism and Pluralism - Negative 0
1 703 Other Economic Groups .01
! 704
1L_




























































































sufficiently low to merit comments is that of Traditional 
Morality: Positive (603) which accounts for an average of less 
than 0.1 per cent of each manifesto. As stated in table 1 above, 
this category covers favourable references to censorship, 
suppression of immorality and the maintenance and stability 
of the family, belief in all of which is frequently seen to 
characterise Irish political culture in general, and the Fianna 
Fail belief system in particular (e.g. Garvin 1978). The very 
low level of emphasis on this category may be a feature of 
much the same logic which can be applied to explain the absence 
of direct nationalist appeals (see above, pp. 10-13); in this 
case, however, it also may be simply that appeals on the basis 
of traditional morality were a feature of party programmes in 
the early years of the state, and that they are largely 
irrelevant to the concerns of post-war Irish politics.
4. What the parties emphasise 
The overall picture
What the various parties don't talk about is, as we have seen, 
of some small interest; but it is what they actually do talk 
about which determines the issue-dimensions in post-war Irish 
politics. Table 4 shows exactly this, listing the ten most 
frequently mentioned categories for each party, as well as 
for all the parties taken together. It is from these few data 
that we can begin finally to define the language of party 
competition in post-war Ireland.
(Table 4 about here)
Let us begin with the last column on table 4, which lists the 
ten leading categories for all parties taken together, and 
which therefore shows the ten most emphasised issue areas in 
post-war Irish politics. Preliminary confirmation of the 
earlier hypothesis concerning the importance of the 'ability 




























































































Table 4: LEADING CATEGORIES, 1948-1981
R A N K Party: Fianna Fail FINE GAEL LABCUR Coalition(PG-Lab) All Parties
1. Govt.Authority and Govt.Authority and Productivity Social Services- Govt.AuthoritvEffectiveness Effectiveness pro expansion and r r f e c  01 ver.e s s
Mean/SD 15.8/17.9 12.6/15.4 11.6/8.9 1 2.0/4 . 3 1C.5/14.2
2. Productivity Incentives Agriculture/
Farmers Social Justice Productivity i
Mean/SD 11.9/9.3 7.9/8.0 9.1 /5.6 7.1/9.1 9.7/8.3
3. Agriculture/ Economic Ortho- S o c i a l  J u s t i c e Democracy Agriculture/Farters doxy Farmers
Mean/SD 82, /5.1 7.7/4.8 8.7/7.6 7.1/6.0 7.4/5.2
4. Social Services- Social Services- S o c i a l  S e r v i c e s Productivity Social Services-pro expansion pro expansion p r o - e x p a n s i o n pro expansion
Mean/SD 6.0/4.7 6.9/6.9 8.1/5.9 6.1/7.0 7.3/5.6
5. Technology/Infra-
structrure
Govt. Efficiency Labour Groups Govt. Efficiency Govt. Efficiency j
1
Mean/SD 5.8/5. 2 6.5/6.4 6.1/5.5 5.6/1.6 5.3/5.6
6. Govt. Efficiency Productivity Controlled Econo­my Incentives Social Justice ;!Mear./SD 4.3/6.9 6.1/5.9 5.8/5 . 7 5 .5/3 . 1 4.8/5.5
7. E d u c a t i o n : Agriculture/ Govt. Efficiency Agriculture/ _  ! Incentives
P r o - e x p a n s i o n Fanners Farmers i•Mean/SD 3 . 9 / 3 . 9 5.3/4.0 5.1/3.6 5.3/0.5 4.1/5.2
8. N a t i o n a l  e f f o r t  and Enterprise Technology/ Govt. Author i ty Techno logy/Inf r a—.
s o c i a l  h a r m o n y Infrastructure and Effective- structure j
3.5/**.6 ness iMear./SD 4.9/5.7 3.9/3.4 4.6/3 . 0 3 .9/4 . 0
9. D e f e n c e  of I r i s h Social Justice Non-Econanic De- Regulation of National Effort !
w a y  of l i f e  - mocraphic Groups Capitalist and Social
p o s i t i v e
3.6/2.8
harmony
Mean/SD 3.**/6.3 4.0/3.3 4.4/4.9 3.2/3.4
10. L a b o u r  g r o u p s National Effort Govt.Authority Controlled 1Labour Grouts jand social 
harmony and Effectiveness Eccncmy
Mean/SD 2 . 7 / 2 . 7 3.9/3.5 3.3/3.9 3.3/1-7 3.0/3.9
N of Manifestos- 10 8 8 2 28 [
N of quasi- ser.t areas 1482 1*52 1382 414 5030
Percentage of 
ur.coced sen- jtences j




























































































Authority and Effectiveness (305) ranks first of the ten 
leading categories. But exactly what sort of appeals does this 
important category include? In the Fianna Fail case the relevant 
statements run from:
'All our cards are on the table, face upwards. If 
Fianna Fail gets a majority in the new Dail, the 
Government will consist of members of our party 
chosen, by the Taoiseach, for their personal 
suitability for the Departments to which they are 
appointed and for their capacity to work together 
as a team. In all democracies, in normal times,
that is how effective governments are formed ....
As an alternative you are offered some kind of 
coalition. Nobody really wants government by a 
coalition. Every coalition Government - irrespective 
of the quality of its members - is a bad government'
(FF 54)
to: 'Fianna Fail - recognising the needs of the future,
will ensure that the leadership, knowledge and 
determination to achieve the necessary changes in 
structure .... (etc) ' (FF77)
In the case of Fine Gael, from:
'(it is) desirable to weaken that party which stood 
alone demanding an overall majority for itself, and 
so, through seeking what it was impossible to 
obtain, confused public life and made only for 
instability of government' (FG57)
to: 'What the country needs now (and has not been
getting) is a government which will be prepared 





























































































And with Labour (just one example will suffice):
'There is only one way forward - with Labour.
But there are many ways backwards. Labour will 
not retard the growth of the new politics by 
cynically abandoning its deals for short term 
party advantage. The hopes of the future will 
not be betrayed.' (L69)
Closely following Government Authority and Effectiveness as 
the second leading issue in Irish politics is Productivity (410), 
a very clearcut and time-honoured theme in Irish politics, 
emphasising as it does the need for economic growth and 
expansion as well as the need for greater levels of employment 
and job opportunities for younger people and would-be emigrants. 
References to Agriculture and Farmers (702) come third in the 
list of leading categories, with Social Services; Pro-Expansion 
(504) fourth; these high rankings are not surprising - the one 
a natural response to the electoral importance of a substantial 
sector of Irish society, and the other a feature of the very 
extensive attempts to build up the Irish welfare state from the 
early 1960s onwards (Maguire 1983). The relative importance of 
Government Efficiency (303), in fifth place, again is unsurprising 
given its substantive association with the leading category, 
Government Authority, and given the initial expectation that 
'governing'-related issues would figure prominently in Irish 
party programmes. Where the issue differs from that of Government 
Authority is that it encompasses the politics of administrative 
efficiency which, particularly in the Fine Gael case, involves 
frequent commitments to the establishment of new government 
agencies to solve specific problems. The remaining five issues 
are, in order of importance, Social Justice (503), Incentives 
(402), Technology/Infrastrueture (411), National Effort and 
Social Harmony (606) and Labour Groups (701), and these will 
be treated in the context of the following discussion of the 
individual parties (since there were only two coalition manifestos, 





























































































The ten leading categories in the case of Fianna Fail reflect 
very closely those of all the parties rather together. As 
might be expected, Government Authority is far and away the 
most highly emphasised Fianna Fail category, with Productivity 
second, Agriculture/Farmers third, and Social Services: Pro- 
Expansion fourth. All four suggest a very ready and appropriate 
image of Fianna Fail in the post-war years as the dominant Irish 
political party, intent on maintaining its original rural base 
and, at the same time, setting out to modernise and expand the 
economy as well as to develop a welfare state which would be 
sufficiently strong to sustain the needs of the other major 
seqment of its electorate, the urban working class. The high 
ranking of Technology/Infrastructure is perhaps more surprising, 
but in fact the category also easily fits into this image of 
a modernising party, ranging from promises to develop 'rural 
electrification, arterial drainage, (and) Power Station 
construction' (FF48) to commitments that, in order’to have a 
competitive advantage over foreigners, industry will be induced 
tc have a structure which will more readily assimilate science 
and technology' (FF77). The relatively high ranking of National 
Effort and Social Harmony in Fianna Fail manifestos further 
emphasises the particularities of the party's appeal. For 
instance, having outlined the possible future difficulties which 
might be faced as a result of a slow-down in emigration and 
Ireland's entry into the European Community, the then Fianna 
Fail Taoiseach emphasised that 'the national effort, considerable 
though it has been, needs to be developed again ... future 
prosperity (will be ensured) only by a great, persistent and 
intelligent effort, in which all the people participate' (FF61). 
This is the essence of Fianna Fail's 'other' nationalism - an 
appeal to national unity which is expressed in social rather 
than territorial terms, and which stems from the party's self- 
image as the builder of a modern Ireland which can stand securely 
in the face of a hostile international environment. Yet the 
modern Ireland which the party wished to build was not to 
be one in which old traditions would be destroyed. Hence the 




























































































(601), a topic which received particular emphasis in 1969, 
when the party stressed the importance of strong rural 
communities and the importance in these of the 'small 
family farm', and further added that 'the preservation of 
the (Irish) language is inextricably bound up with and is 
our most distinctive badge of our own separate nationhood.
No nation has ever voluntary abandoned its own language, and 
we have no intention of abandoning ours' (FF69) . Fianna Fail's 
stress on 'defence of the Irish way' was partly a reaction 
to the threatened rise of the more socialist-sounding Labour 
party, and partly in response to the Fine Gael voices which 
spoke of ending the compulsory teaching of Irish in schools. 
But even apart from the specific circumstances of 1969, the 
thread of an appeal to traditional Ireland has always run 
through Fianna Fail rhetoric, though at times it has sat 
uneasily with the party's commitment to social and economic 
development. Here too, perhaps, we are tapping into a variant 
of a commitment to traditional morality, the specific 
category (603) which, it will be recalled, received a 
surprisingly low emphasis in the party's programmes.
Fine Gael
Though Fine Gael shows many leading categories in common with 
Fianna Fail - we may note in particular the emphasis on 
Government Authority - the few differences which do exist are 
very striking. The second ranking Fine Gael category, for 
instance, is Incentives, which does not figure at all in the 
ten leading Fianna Fail categories, while the third category, 
Economic Orthodoxy (414) is also absent from the Fianna Fail 
list. As was stated in table 1, Incentives is the category 
covering references to wage and tax policies which are designed 
to encourage enterprise, references to which abound in almost all 
Fine Gael's programmes. In the Just Society document, for 
instance, the party pledged itself to 'encourage the return 




























































































by moderating the incidence of taxation on earned incomes 
at certain levels' and to 'alter the present system of charging 
depreciation for tax purposes, so that adequate provision can 
be made for the replacement of fixed assets and thereby assist 
increased production' (FG65). This particular programme also 
specifies at great length 'the need for a rational determination 
of credit policy' and the need to strengthen the powers of the 
Central Bank, themes similar to those which again echo in 
other programmes of the party, and which contribute to the 
high ranking of the Economic Orthodoxy (414) category. The 
party's emphasis on Enterprise (401) is yet another example of 
this time of thinking and, indeed, ranks above Social Justice 
in the party's leading categories. In terms of the later 
programmes, however, Social Justice receives a much greater 
emphasis by Fine Gael than does Enterprise (cf table 2 above). 
Though this new stress is already evident in 1961, 
it is again in the 1965 programme that the party's new appeal is 
most clearly formulated, as, for instance, can be noted in the 
Introduction to the Just Society document which states that 
'equality of opportunity is, in contemporary Ireland, non­
existent. We seek office to work towards a society in which 
freedom and equality are not concepts from an academic 
textbook but are expressed in real and tangible conditions which 
all our people can enjoy'(FG65).
Labour
Labour, the smallest of the three parties, is perhaps most 
striking for the relatively low emphasis which it places on 
Government Authority, which ranks tenth in the party's list of 
leading categories as against first in the leading categories 
of both Fianna Fail and Fine Gael. The first ranking category 
for Labour is Productivity, a reflection of the party's persistent 
concern with the need to tackle unemployment and emigration. What 
is perhaps surprising to those not familiar with Labour's history 
is that Agriculture/Farmers ranks significantly higher than




























































































an urban electorate in the late 1960s, however, Labour has 
traditionally been a party of the rural and small town proletariat 
as well as, to an extent, a party which wins certain support 
from small farmers. Indeed, in many cases one gets the 
impression that Labour's emphasis on agriculture stems not 
so much from a desire to expand its rural base, but rather from 
the need to avoid alienating its traditional support. Moreover, 
while the emphasis on agriculture has declined over time (cf 
table 2.) , it remains relatively pronourted vis a vis the party's 
emphasis on Labour groups. Indeed, both categories evidence a 
decline over time, as does Labour emphasis on the other 'Groups' 
category in its leading ten issues, Non-Economic Demographic 
Groups (705). The decline in all three suggests that rather 
than attempting to change its base from one sector of the 
population to another, Labour instead has been seeking to 
generalise its appeal in a fashion similar to that of its 
larger opponents, but using a more socialist rhetoric to do 
so. One possible symptom of this is the relative growth in 
emphasis on the category Controlled Economy (412) which ranks 
sixth in the leading categories for the post-war period as 
a whole, and which receives relatively greater emphasis in the 
manifestos published from 1965 onwards (cf table 2 above).
Party specific categories and valence issues
A recent analysis of British and American party programmes by 
Budge and Farlie (1983) suggests that parties do not so much 
compete on the same issues but rather 'own' particular issues 
which they then stress at election time. In other words, parties 
talk past one another rather than engaging in direct confrontation, 
and individual parties succed or fail according to the salience 
of, or electoral concern for their issues rather than those 
of their opponents. To the extent that this is true, then in 
Ireland as elsewhere we should find evidence of such 'selective 




























































































that is, we could expect to find categories within one party's 
list v/hich are not present in the other parties' lists, and 
each party could be expected to have its own set of exclusive 
issues. Conversely, to the extent that we find similarities 
across ail the different lists of leading categories, these 
common categories could be seen to represent 'consensual' 
issues which all three parties find it necessary to
enphaise.
Assessing the data in table 4 in these terms suggests a rather 
intriquing picture whereby much of that Fianna Fail emphasises 
is not specific to it as a party, while much of what Fine Gael 
emphasises is party-specific. Taking the Fianna Fail case first, 
v/e see that its first four leading categories are shared by both 
Fine Gael and Labour (though the rankings differ), as is its 
sixth leading category. Of the remaining five categories, two 
(Technology/Infrastructure and Labour Groups)are shared by 
Labour, and one (National Effort/Social Harmony) by Fine Gael.
Two categories alone are exclusive to Fianna Fail - Education: 
Pro-Expansion, which is not of itself a very significant issue 
in Irish politics, and Defence of Irish Way of Life: Positive, 
which is rather appropriate in the case of a party which 
traditionally has seen itself as the repository of the national 
conscience. Neither category ranks particularly high in the 
Fianna Fail list, however, the one being in seventh and the 
other in ninth position.
Fine Gael presents quite a different and in many senses more 
revealing picture. Though five of its leading categories are 
shared bv both Fianna Fail and Labour, a sixth (Social Justice) 
by Labour alone, and a seventh (National Effort) by Fianna Fail 
alone, its three remaining exclusive categories both rank 
relatively highly (second, third and eighth positions) and fit 
together in a wTider, substantive sense. These categories are 
Incentives, Economic Orthodoxy and Enterprise, all three of which 
can be seen to represent a classic economic conservatism, and 
al l. three of which in this sense help to create the most clearly 




























































































was traditionally the party of the Irish propertied class, 
representing the large farming and commercial interests which 
feared the rise of Fianna Fail in the late 1920s and early 
1930s. And while Fianna Fail has since become the party of 
Government in Ireland, Fine Gael has nevertheless remained in 
many senses the party of the social and economic establishment 
(Mair 1983); notwithstanding its relatively recent conversion 
to social justice, and notwithstanding its even more recent 
attempts to win the support of a broader and more socially 
heterogeneous section of the Irish electorate, the evidence of 
its programmes suggests the maintenance of a classic conservative 
appeal•
The profile presented by Labour is much less distinctive. Five 
of its leading categories(including the first, second and fourth) 
are shared by both its opponents, one other by Fine Gael alone 
(Social Justice), and two by Fianna Fail alone (Labour Groups 
and Technology/Infrastrueture). There remain two exclusive 
issues, Controlled Economy and Non-Economic Demographic Groups, 
the first of which has already been briefly discussed above, 
and neither of which rank in the top five leading issues of the 
party.
The data in table 4 further suggest the existence of five 'consen­
sual' issues (as defined above to mean those categories
included in the leading categories of all three parties and, 
in this case, in those of the two coalition manifestos);
Government Authority, Productivity, Agriculture/Farmers, Social 
Services: Pro-Expansion, and Government Efficiency. Two of these 
five come from the Government domain, and one each from the 
Economy, Groups and Welfare domains. That these are consensual 
issues is not in itself surprising; what is significant, however, 
is their relative rankings in the parties' lists. The five 
rank in the first four and sixth positions in the Fianna Fail 
programmes, in the first, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh 
positions in the Fine Gael manifestos, and in the first, second, 




























































































If we score these rankings, giving a score of 10 to the first 
position, 9 to the second position, and so on, then a maximum 
emphasis on the five consensual issues would be indicated by 
a score of 40 (10+9+8+7+6) and a minimum emphasis by a score 
of 15 (5+4+3+2+1). The closer a party's score on these 
categories approaches to 40,then the closer that party comes 
to placing a maximum emphasis on consensual issues. The actual 
scores are revealing, with Fianna Fail at 39, Fine Gael at 32, 
Labour at 31 and the coalition at 30.
Scoring exclusive issues, on the other hand (i.e. those 
categories which appear only in the list of one party - the 
coalition is excluded here), we find that Fianna Fail scores 
6 out of a possible maximum of 19, Fine Gael scores 20 out 
of a possible maximum of 27, and Labour scores 6 out of a 
possible maximum of 19. In other words, Fianna Fail places 
the greatest emphasis on consensual issues, while Fine Gael 
piaces the greatest emphasis oh party-soecific issues. Here 
perhaps more than anywhere else we see the most concrete 
evidence to bolster Fianna Fail's traditional claim to be 
the only 'national' party, as against the more 'sectional' 




























































































V. THE FIRST-STAGE FACTOR ANALYSIS
(Note: pressures of time prevent a full assessment of the 
results of the factor analysis. This and the following section' 
of the paper will therefore be presented in abbreviated form.)
In common with the procedures adopted by the ECPR research 
group, the factor analysis was conducted in two stages. The 
first stage involves factor analysing the data within each 
domain, and the second stage involves analysing the factor 
scores which result from the first stage. Two points are worth 
noting here: first, the first-stage analysis normally includes 
only categories which record at least 1 per cent of all 
manifestos or at least 3 per cent of the manifestos of a 
particular party. Though there are two exceptions to this rule 
in the Irish case (see above, pp. 36-37), this means that all 
the categories listed in table 3 above are excluded from the 
factor analysis. Since this also means that only one category 
remains in the External domain and two in the Freedom and 
Democracy domain, these original categories are used directly 
in lieu of factor scores as inputs into the second stage. The 
second point to note is that the unusual character of the Fianna 
Fail ’manifesto’ of 1973 means that is also excluded from the 
factor analysis.
(Tables 5-9 about here)
Table 5 reports the results of the factor analysis in the 
Government domain, the first to be treated in this way. The 
loadings are quite straightforward and interpretable: factor 
3:1, which we call Government Efficiency, loads very heavily 
onto Decentralisation: Positive and slightly less heavily onto 
Government Efficiency itself. Factor 3:2, loads very heavily 
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Table 6 reports the results of the analysis in the Economy 
domain. Here three factors were extracted: factor 4:1, 
positively loading on Enterprise, Incentives and Economic 
Orthodoxy, and negatively on Technology/Infrastructure, has 
been labelled Capitalist Economy. Factor 4:2 loads positively 
on Economic Planning, Controlled Economy and Nationalisation, 
and this has been labelled Socialist Economy. Factor 4:3 is 
less readily interpreted, loading positively on Incentives 
and negatively on Productivity. Since only the first two factors 
are used as inputs into the second-stage analysis, this third 
factor, labelled simply Incentives vs. Productivity, is less 
relevant to our concerns here.
Table 7 reports the analysis of the Welfare domain. The first 
factor here, factor 5:1, loads very heavily onto Environmental 
Protection and Art, Sport, Leisure, Media, and has been called 
simply Quality of Life. Factor 5:2 loads positively on Social 
Services: Pro-Expansion and Education: Pro-Expansion and 
negatively on Social Justice. Perhaps this factor represents 
a tendency to make specific commitments to expand the welfare 
state as against a tendency to make simply rhetorical commitments 
to the general idea of social justice; in any case, it has been 
labelled Social Services vs. Social Justice.
Table 8 reports the analysis in the Social Fabric domain.
Factor 6:1 loads on Law and Order and National Effort and Social 
Harmony. In one sense this represents the view that all should 
work together in the national interest, and, if there is 
unwillingness to do so, then the forces of the state will be 
used to control any signs of dissidence. In any case, both 
categories sit well together - the one representing the force 
of law, the other the force of persuasion - and the factor has 
been labelled Social Discipline. Factor 6:2 loads heavily onto 





























































































Table 9 reports the analysis in the Groups domain, the last 
to be considered here, Factor 7:1 loads onto Labour Groups 
and Non-Econoraic Demographic Groups (mainly involving women 
and young people), and suggests a concern for sections of the 
population which may be seen in some way to have little 
influence or to be discriminated against. It is labelled simply 
Non-Economic Groups and Labour. Factor 7:2 loads very heavily 
onto Agriculture/Farmers and slightly less heavily onto 
Labour Groups, both of which represent significant economic 
sectoral interests. The factor is therefore called Economic Groups.
(Table 10 about here)
Finally, table 10 reports the means and standard deviations, by 
party, of the factor scores derived from the first-stage analysis. 
These factor scores, plus the remaining original categories in 
the External and Freedom and Democracy domains have been used 
as the input data for the second-stage factor analysis. The 
table itself needs little comment. The Government Efficiency 
factor tends to divide Fianna Fail and Labour from Fine Gael, 
while Government Authority tends to divide the larger parties 
from Labour. Within the Economy domain, Labour scores positively 
or. Socialist Economics and negatively on Capitalist Economics, 
with Fine Gael showing the completely reverse pattern, and 
Fianna Fail scoring negatively on both. Fine Gael, in turn, 
scores negatively on both welfare factors, with Fianna Fail 
scoring positively on Social Services vs. Social Justice and 
negatively on Quality of Life, while Labour shows the opposite 
pattern. Within the Social Fabric domain, Fianna Fail is the 
only party with a positive score on Defence of Irish Way of 
Life; Fine Gael scores quite highly on Social Discipline, while 
Labour records negative scores on both factors. Finally, in 
the Groups domain, Labour socres positively and Fine Gael 
negatively on both factors, with Fianna Fail recording a 
positive score on Economic Groups and a negative score on 
Non-Economic Groups and Labour. If any pattern is evident at 
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between Fine Gael and Labour, with Fianna Fail somewhere in 
between: the two former parties show quite opposing scores 
in the Government, Economy, Social Fabric and Groups domains. 
Only in the second welfare factor do their mean scores look 
the same vis a vis a quite different Fianna Fail mean score, 
though it is also interesting to note the second factor in 
the Social Fabric domain, where Fine Gael's slightly negative 
mean score tends to place it on the same side of the divide 
as Labour. However, it should also be noted that the high 
standard deviations suggest that these particular data 



























































































VI. THE SECOND-STAGE FACTOR ANALYSIS
The second and final stage of the feictor analysis reveals 
five second-order factors which represent the five principal 
issue dimensions in post-war Irish politics. Table 11 reports 
the loadings of these five dimensions on the factors derived 
from the first-stage analysis and on the three original 
categories (102,201 and 202) used as input in the External 
and Freedom and Democracy domains. Table 11 also shows the 
correlation coefficients between Dimensions I to V with 
the original categories used in the first-stage domain 
analysis. These coefficients are shown in order to get a 
clearer picture of the actual substance of the five dimensions.
(Table 11 about here)
The first dimension (i.e. the first second-stage factor) 
has been defined as Principles Governing the Organisation 
of Society, a bipolar factor with positive loadings indicating 
a conservative emphasis and negative loadings indicating a 
liberal emphasis. The positive loadings are on (first-stage) 
factors 3:1, Government Authority, and 6:1, Social Discipline. 
In terms of the original categories included in the first- 
stage analysis, Dimension I correlates positively (r̂ , .5) with 
categories 305,605 and 606. Dimension I also loads negatively 
on factor 7:1, Non-Economic Groups and Labour, and correlates 
negatively with categories 504 and 705. Perhaps the closest 
approximation to this dimension in terms of what has been 
identified as one of the major components in Irish political 
culture, is authoritarianism (e.g. Schmitt 1973 , pp 43-54) .
But since the dimension relates so specifically to the original 
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it can also be seen to reflect a variant of the hypothesised 
'ability to govern' issue. Indeed, Dimension I seems to span 
both Government Authority and - for want of a better term - 
Social Authority in a fashion which suggests a heavy emphasis 
on a sort of Irish dirigisme. Certainly, Dimension I bears 
no relation to what has normally been considered to be the 
main motive force of Irish political alignments, i.e. the 
issue of territorial nationalism.
The second principal dimension in Table 11 has been identified 
as Emphasis on Capitalist Economics and Irish Unity. This 
dimension loads positively on category 102 and factor 4:1, 
Capitalist Economy, and correlates positively with categories 
401 and 402. Though less than 0.5, the relatively strong 
correlation with category 414 is also noteworthy. The negative 
loading of Dimension II is simply on factor 7:2, Economic 
Groups, correlating negatively with categories 411 and 702.
The association in Dimension II of an otherwise straight 
'capitalist economics' loading with Irish unity is, I believe, 
largely fortuitous. As has already been noted, the Economy 
categories involved here are primarily the 'exclusive' issues 
of Fine Gael, while Fine Gael is also the party which has 
tended to place greater and more consistent emphasis on pro- 
Irish unity statements. In this sense, Dimension II is tapping 
the particular emphases of Fine Gael.
Dimension III is of less substantive importance. Identified 
here as Emphasis on Rights of the Individual, the only loadings 
of significance are on categories 201 and 202,. and factor 7:1, 
non-Economic Groups and Labour, on which it loads negatively. 
Dimension III also correlates negatively with two of the original 
Groups categories, 701 and 705. What this dimension seems to tap 
therefore is a belief in the rights of the individual as against 




























































































Dimension IV is perhaps the closest to a purely 'Fianna 
Fail dimension', correlating positively with categories 
506 and 601, both of which have been identified as the 
only 'exclusive' Fianna Fail categories. Defined here as 
Emphasis on Education and Irish Culture, Dimension IV loads 
positively onto factors 5:2, Social Services vs Social 
Justice, and 6:2, Defence of Irish Way of Life. It also 
shows a negative, but not very strong correlation with 
the original category 503.
Dimension V has been defined here as Emphasis on Socialist 
Economy, and in some sense may be considered the obverse 
of Dimension II. It loads positively onto factor 4:2, Socialist 
Economy, and correlates positively with categories 404,413 
and 501. Dimension V has no significant negative loadings, nor 
does it show any significant negative correlations with 
any of the original categories. In this sense it is a very 
unipolar dimension, appearing to tap specifically Labour 
emphases in the manifestos.
Plotting the Parties
The definition of Dimensions I to V clearly represents one 
of the more important findings of this study, but unfortunately 
pressures of time prevent their fuller elaboration and 
discussion. The remaining part of this section will therefore 
be devoted to commenting briefly on a plotting of the 
various parties' positions along combinations of these five 
dimensions, a more complete analysis of which will have 
to wait for a later draft. Figures 2 to 5 and 2A to 5A show 
these party positions. Each of the main figures (2 to 5) is 
accompanied by a summary figure (2A to 5A), while some of 
the latter also employ a crude périodisation to show the 
parties' movements through time.
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Figure 2 maps the parties' positions in the space created 
by Dimensions I and II. The first point to note here is the 
relatively consistent positioning of the two larger parties, 
Fianna Fail and Fine Gael. If we ignore for a moment the 
clearly outlying positions of FG51 and FG57, as well as that 
of FF69, we find that Fine Gael tends to lie in a relatively 
small area on the positive side of Dimension II, while 
Fianna Fail occupies a slighlt larger area on the negative 
side of this dimension. Both parties straddle Dimension I, 
Principles Governing the Organisation of Society, while it 
is precisely this dimension (tapping a small vs large party 
conflict?) which separates Labour from its two opponents.
It is also interesting to note the marked conservative 
trend in Fianna Fail programmes between 1948 and 1961 as 
shown by their increasing shift to the right along Dimension I. 
Labour straddles the Capitalist Economy and Irish Unity 
dimension and, surprisingly, we can see that, with the 
exception of L51, all of the party's pre-1969 programmes 
fall on the 'low' emphasis side of this dimension. Moreover, 
neither the positions shown in Figure 2, nor those summarised 
in Figure 2A, really suggest much of an issue-basis for the 
Fine Gael-Labour coalitions. As can be seen from Figure 2A, 
the coalition programmes of 1973 and 1977 occupy a position 
very close to that of Fine Gael (ignoring FG51 and FG57), while 
the average Labour location is quite distant. The only 
possible justification for coalition evident from these 
Figures is if the coalition were to be based on alignments 
along Dimension I. Yet though the average position of Labour 
and that of Fine Gael are on the 'liberal' side of this 
Dimension, nevertheless even here Fine Gael is closer to 
Fianna Fail than it is to Labour.
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The relative positions of the parties are much less 
distinct in Figure 3, which represents the space created 
by Dimensions I and IV, the latter being that identified 
as the closest approximation to a purely Fianna Fail 
dimension. In this case, both of the larger parties 
tend to straddle both dimensions, but there is also a 
slight tendency towards a separation of Fine Gael and 
Labour with Fianna Fail orienting towards the centre 
position vis a vis the other parties. Yet if we look 
at the summary of these positions in Figure 3A the picture 
is quite different and, moreover, suggests an issue-basis 
for the Fine Gael-Labour coalition. The average position 
of both these parties (excluding outlying cases) is in 
the lower left-hand quadrant, on the liberal side of 
Dimension I and the low emphasis side of Dimension IV.
Fianna Fail, on the other hand, and excluding the 1969 case, 
lies in the upper right-hand quadrant, on thè conservative 
side of Dimension I and the high emphasis side of 
Dimension IV.
(Figures 4 and 4A about here)
The Labour-Fine Gael alignment vs. Fianna Fail is also 
evident in Figure 4, which represents the space created 
by Dimensions I and V. Here Labour and Fine Gael are 
again overlapping substantially, with Fianna Fail, partic­
ularly in the later years, being somewhat separated. It 
is also interesting to note the different positions of 
Fine Gael's early and later programmes, a point which is 
even more evident from Figure 4A. While the average positions 
of the three parties for the period as a whole might suggest 
that Fine Gael has more in common with Fianna Fail than 
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three Fine Gael programmes (1965,1969 and 1981) suggests 
that Just Society Fine Gael is in fact very similar to 
post-war Labour. Moreover, the coalition manifestos in this 
case lie almost exactly half-way between Labour and late 
Fine Gael, while all three positions are quite removed from 
that occupied by Fianna Fail. Thus while Fine Gael programmes 
in general fall on the low emphasis side of the Socialist 
Economy Dimension, the programmes from the Just Society 
onwards occupy a position clearly on the Labour side of 
the divide.
(Figures 5 and 5A about here)
The final figure presented in this context shows the parties' 
positions in the space created by Dimensions II and V, the 
one emphasising Capitalist Economics and Irish Unity (ident­
ified as the Fine Gael dimension), and the other Socialist 
Economy (identified as the Labour dimension) - see Figure 5, 
While all three parties occupy reasonably distinct areas 
in this space, the contrast between Labour and Fine Gael is 
particularly striking, especially in the earlier part of 
the period. The positions are also summarised in Figure 5A, 
which this time separates all three parties into early and 
late periods. As can be seen from this Figure, the average 
postion of each party is quite different if we take the 
post-war period as a whole. Fianna Fail lies in the lower 
left-hand quadrant, with a low emphasis on both dimensions; 
Labour lies in the upper left-hand quadrant, with a low 
emphasis on Dimension II and a high emphasis on Dimension 
V, while Fine Gael lies (only marginally) i-n the lower 
right-hand quadrant, with a significantly high emphasis on 
Dimension II and a slightly low emphasis on Dimension V. 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































upper right-hand quadrant, with a high emphasis on both 
dimensions. On the face of it, therefore, these data on 
the post-war positions in general would not suggest the 
presence of an issue basis in the Fine Gael-Labour 
coalitions.
By breaking the period into two, however, we get a very 
different picture: Fine Gael(I), representing the position 
of the 1948,1954,1957 and 1961 manifestôs, shifts position 
significantly to become Fine Gael(II). Labour also moves 
into the upper-right-hand quadrant in the later years.
From 1965 onwards, in fact, we find both parties in very 
proximate positions, with the coalition manifestos in 
an intermediate - albeit slightly closer to Fine Gael - 
location. Thus by breaking the post-war period into 
two, we find substantive issue-based evidence for the 
anti-Fianna Fail alliance in the 1970s. Tangentially, it 
is also interesting to note Fianna Fail's slight shift 





























































































VII. THE LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION.
The final section which will be treated in this now fore­
shortened paper concerns the parties' positions on a left-right 
dimension. As is clear from the previous section, none of the 
final five factors which have been identified correspond to 
a straight left-right dimension. To be sure, Dimensions II and 
V run reasonably close to this, but the former also loads 
onto pro-Irish unity statements, while the latter alone loads 
only onto the socialist components of the manifestos and is 
also the weakest of the five dimensions.
(Table 12 about here)
Given these results, this final section will concern only 
the Economy domain, analysing the categories in this area 
in an effort to see if a left-right dimension can be established 
and, if so, to then identify the positions of the parties along 
this dimension. Table 12 presents the results of a factor 
analysis on the categories in the Economy domain only, forcing 
a one-factor solution in order to extract a single dimension.
The results are quite gratifying. The factor loads positively 
()/ .5) on Controlled- Economy and Nationalisation, with slightly 
lower but nevertheless still positive loadings on Regulation 
of Capitalism and Economic Planning. These positive loadings 
therefore suggest a left pole in the single factor. Moreover, 
the factor also loads negatively on the classic conservative 
categories, Enterprise and Economic Orthodoxy, with a slightly 
lower but still negative loading on Incentives. This in turn 
suggests that the factor has a right pole. In effect, therefore, 
the application of a one-factor solution to the Economy 
domain results in a clear left-right dimension.
The next step is obviously to take the resulting factor 
scores and to thus position the parties on this dimension.
In order to do this, however, it seems advisable to reverse 
the plus and minus signs of the loadings and therefore also 
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that the resulting plot will correspond to the conventional 
layout of left-right scales, i.e. having left on the minus 
side and right on the plus side of the scale. It should be 
clear that this change does not in any way affect the relative 
positions of the parties or the side of the left-right scale 
on which they are located.
(Figure 6 about here)
The average positions of the parties for the post-war period 
as a whole are shown in Figure 6. Though the scale is relatively 
short, nevertheless it clearly distinguishes the two coalition 
parties, Labour and Fine Gael, the one occupying the leftmost 
position, the other the rightmost position. Fianna Fail occupies 
almost the exact centre of the dimension. What is also interesting 
to note is that the two coalition manifestos lie clearly on 
the Labour - and left - side of the dimension. Given the right­
positioning of Fine Gael, the dominant partner in the coalitions, 
this left location seems at first sight somewhat anomalous. 
However, if we recall the evidence of Fine Gael's movement 
along Dimensions II and V as defined in the analysis of all 
seven domains in the previous section of this paper, then a 
closer look at the factor scores on the left-right dimension 
might provide similar evidence of a growing proximity between 
Fine Gael and Labour.
Figure 7 accordingly plots the movement of all three parties 
over time along the left-right dimension, the scale of which 
is correspondingly enlarged in order to accommodate the more 
extreme positions of individual programmes. It is in this 
figure that we find clearest evidence of the difference between 
the early and later periods in post-war Irish politics. With 
the exception of 1957, when Fianna Fail moved slightly to the 
left of Labour as it sought to return to Government, all three 
parties maintain more or less steady positions vis a vis one 
another from 1948 up to and including 1961: Fine Gael on the 
right - particularly so in 1951 when defending its record in 
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(Figure 7 about here)
In 1965 the positions modified: a slight shift to the right 
by Fianna Fail, and a fairly major shift to the left by 
the new, Just Society, Fine Gael, left both larger parties 
occupying almost exactly the same position. This new tendency . 
was even more evident in 1969; though Fine Gael retreated 
rightwards again, a major shift to the right by Fianna Fail 
placed that party in its most conservative position since 
the war, and also meant that, for the first time in this 
period, both Labour and Fine Gael were on the left of their 
traditional opponent. In 1973 both parties formed a coalition 
and campaigned on a joint programme.
Though we have not data for Fianna Fail in the 1973 election, 
the 1977 picture shows what might almost be a textbook example 
of the 'waning of opposition', with both Fianna Fail and 
the coalition occupying much the same position on the left- 
right dimension. In 1981, when all three parties ran independ­
ent campaigns, they reverted to their original pre-1965 
positions - Labour on the left, Fine Gael on the right, and 
Fianna Fail in the centre. This time, however, the distances 
between the parties had been considerably reduced.
Since the left-right dimension did not clearly emerge from 
the overall analysis in the previous section, it is difficult 
to argue that it represents a significant cleavage in post-war 
Irish politics. Nevertheless, as the analysis in this final 
section shows, the left-right dimension which was extracted 
from the Economy domain does provide a picture which is 
consonant with what we do know of post-war party competition 
in Ireland. In particular, the movement of the parties along 
this dimension does suggest a very plausible basis for the 
Fine Gael-Labour coalitions of 1973 and 1977. And while such 
an argument could also be advanced concerning the findings 
in the previous section, it is the positions on this left- 




























































































Figure 7: MOVEMENT PF PARTIES LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION, 8-19811
1N o t e s : A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h e  on e  f a c t o r  s o l u t i o n ,  L e f t  s c o r e s  s h o u l d  be p o s i t i v e  an d  R i g h t  s c o r e s  n e g a t i v e ;  in 
o r d e r  to  m a i n t a i n  t h e  c o n v e n t i o n a l  l a y o u t  of s u c h  a l e f t - r i g h t  d i m e n s i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  s i g n s  h a v e  s i m p l y  b e e n 
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1. Clann na Poblachta actually stayed outside the second 
Coalition Cabinet, though it did pledge its support to the 
Government. National Labour, which entered the 1948 Cabinet 
as a separate party before merging once more with Labour in 
1950, should also perhaps be included as a relevant party, 
though it is excluded from this particular analysis.
2. There are archival problems concerning all three parties: 
Labour's records were apparently stolen when the party moved 
headquarters; those of Fine Gael - never terribly comprehensive 
in any case - have been transferred to the Archives Department
of University College Dublin but, at least when last checked, had 
not been properly catalogued; Fianna Fail's records have been 
stuffed at random into large black plastic rubbish sacks and 
left in a dusty room in the attic of party headquarters.
3. Jack Lynch, interview, 19 November 1980.
4. Since then, much of the blame for Ireland's cu-rent budget 
problems have been laid at the door of the Fianna Fail 1977 
Manifesto. Indeed, when asked about his party's manifesto in 
1981, a Fine Gael spokesman told me that 'we don't have a 
manifesto. Fine Gael has a programme. Manifesto is a dirty 
word after the last election'.
5. Jack Lynch, interview, 19 November 1980.
6. Liam Cosgrave, interview, 18 November 1980.
7. Figures supplied by Fine Gael.
8. Jack Lynch, interview, 19 November 1980.
9. Cian 0 hEigeartaigh, 'Shadow Over Garret's Government',
Sunday Tribune 5 July 1981.
10. Or so it is claimed by Brendan Halligan, former General 
Secretary of the Labour Party (interview, 19 November 1980). 
Halligan also claims that a similar process occured in Fianna 
Fail in 1973, in that the commitment to abolish rates was first 
proposed before the election was called, but that the idea was 
vetoed by the then Finance Minister, George Colley. In the event, 
the proposal made a belated and much less credible appearance 




























































































11. The 'quasi-sentence' is chosen as the unit of analysis 
rather than the 'full' sentence since many of the latter 
include subclauses which require separate coding. The codinq
in the Irish case was carried out by the author, and checked with 
a political scientist familiar with the literature on post-war 
Irish politics.
12. Percentages are calculated by averaging out the figures for 
each party, thus allowing each programme equal weight regardless 
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